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QUANTUM EQUILIBRIUM AND THE
ORIGIN OF ABSOLUTE UNCERTAINTY
Detlef Du¨rr,1,2 Sheldon Goldstein,1 and Nino Zangh´i1,3
Dedicated to the memory of J. S. Bell.
Abstract. The quantum formalism is a “measurement” formalism—a phenomenological
formalism describing certain macroscopic regularities. We argue that it can be regarded,
and best be understood, as arising from Bohmian mechanics, which is what emerges from
Schro¨dinger’s equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that “particles” means
particles. While distinctly non-Newtonian, Bohmian mechanics is a fully deterministic theory
of particles in motion, a motion choreographed by the wave function. We find that a Bohmian
universe, though deterministic, evolves in such a manner that an appearance of randomness
emerges, precisely as described by the quantum formalism and given, for example, by “ρ =
|ψ|2.” A crucial ingredient in our analysis of the origin of this randomness is the notion of the
effective wave function of a subsystem, a notion of interest in its own right and of relevance
to any discussion of quantum theory. When the quantum formalism is regarded as arising in
this way, the paradoxes and perplexities so often associated with (nonrelativistic) quantum
theory simply evaporate.
KEY WORDS: Quantum randomness; quantum uncertainty; hidden variables; effective
wave function; collapse of the wave function; the measurement problem; Bohm’s causal inter-
pretation of quantum theory; pilot wave; foundations of quantum mechanics.
1. Introduction
I am, in fact, rather firmly convinced that the essentially statistical character
of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to the fact that this
(theory) operates with an incomplete description of physical systems. (Einstein,
in ref. 50, p. 666)
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What is randomness? probability? certainty? knowledge? These are old and difficult
questions, and we shall not focus on them here. Nonetheless, we shall obtain sharp, striking
conclusions concerning the relationship between these concepts.
Our primary concern in this paper lies with the status and origin of randomness in
quantum theory. According to the quantum formalism, measurements performed on a
quantum system with definite wave function ψ typically yield random results. Moreover,
even the specification of the wave function of the composite system including the apparatus
for performing the measurement will not generally diminish this randomness. However,
the quantum dynamics governing the evolution of the wave function over time, at least
when no measurement is being performed, and given, say, by Schro¨dinger’s equation, is
completely deterministic. Thus, insofar as the particular physical processes which we call
measurements are governed by the same fundamental physical laws that govern all other
processes,1 one is naturally led to the hypothesis that the origin of the randomness in the
results of quantum measurements lies in random initial conditions, in our ignorance of
the complete description of the system of interest—including the apparatus—of which we
know only the wave function.
But according to orthodox quantum theory, and most nonorthodox interpretations as
well, the complete description of a system is provided by its wave function alone, and there
is no property of the system beyond its wave function (our ignorance of) which might
account for the observed quantum randomness. Indeed, it used to be widely claimed, on
the authority of von Neumann [56], that such properties, the so called hidden variables, are
impossible, that as a matter of mathematics, averaging over ignorance cannot reproduce
statistics compatible with the predictions of the quantum formalism. And this claim is
even now not uncommon, despite the fact that a widely discussed counterexample, the
quantum theory of David Bohm [13,14], has existed for almost four decades.2
1And it is difficult to believe that this is not so; the very notion of measurement itself seems too
imprecise to allow such a distinction within a fundamental theory, even if we were otherwise somehow
attracted by the granting to measurement of an extraordinary status.
2For an analysis of why von Neumann’s and related “impossibility proofs” are not nearly so physically
relevant as frequently imagined, see Bell’s article [2]. (See also the celebrated article of Bell [3] for an “im-
possibility proof” which does have physical significance. See as well [6].) For a recent, and comprehensive,
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We shall call this theory, which will be “derived” and described in detail in Section 3,
Bohmian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics is a new mechanics, a completely deter-
ministic—but distinctly non-Newtonian—theory of particles in motion, with the wave
function itself guiding this motion. (Thus the “hidden variables” for Bohmian mechanics
are simply the particle positions themselves.) Moreover, while its formulation does not
involve the notion of quantum observables, as given by self-adjoint operators—so that its re-
lationship to the quantum formalism may at first appear somewhat obscure—it can in fact
be shown that Bohmian mechanics not only accounts for quantum phenomena [14,15,18],
but also embodies the quantum formalism itself as the very expression of its empirical
import [29]. (The analysis in the present paper establishes agreement between Bohmian
mechanics and the quantum formalism without addressing the question of how the detailed
quantum formalism naturally emerges—how and why specific operators, such as the en-
ergy, momentum, and angular momentum operators, end up playing the roles they do, as
well as why “observables” should rather generally be identified with self-adjoint operators.
We shall answer these questions in [29], in which a general analysis of measurement from
a Bohmian perspective is presented. We emphasize that the present paper is not at all
concerned directly with measurement per se, not even of positions.) That this is so is for
the most part quite straightforward, but it does involve a crucial subtlety which, so far as
we know, has never been dealt with in a completely satisfactory manner.
The subtlety to which we refer concerns the origin of the very randomness so charac-
teristic of quantum phenomena. The predictions of Bohmian mechanics concerning the
results of a quantum experiment can easily be seen to be precisely those of the quantum
formalism, provided it is assumed that prior to the experiment the positions of the particles
of the systems involved are randomly distributed according to Born’s statistical law, i.e.,
according to the probability distribution given by |ψ|
2
. And the difficulty upon which we
shall focus here concerns the status—the justification and significance—of this assumption
within Bohmian mechanics: not just why it should be satisfied, but also, and perhaps more
important, what—in a completely deterministic theory—it could possibly mean!
account of Bohm’s ideas see [20].
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In Section 2 we provide some background to Bohmian mechanics, describing its rela-
tionship to other approaches to quantum mechanics and how in fact it emerges from an
analysis of these alternatives. This section, which presents a rather personal perspective
on these matters, will play no role in the detailed analysis of the later sections and may
be skipped on a first reading of this paper.
The crucial concepts in our analysis of Bohmian mechanics are those of effective wave
function (Section 5) and quantum equilibrium (Sections 4, 6, 13, and 14). The latter
is a concept analogous to, but quite distinct from, thermodynamic equilibrium. In par-
ticular, quantum equilibrium provides us with a precise and natural notion of typicality
(Section 7), a concept which frequently arises in the analysis of “large systems” and of
the “long time behavior” of systems of any size. For a universe governed by Bohmian
mechanics it is of course true that, given the initial wave function and the initial positions
of all particles, everything is completely determined and nothing whatsoever is actually
random. Nonetheless, we show that typical initial configurations, for the universe as a
whole, evolve in such a way as to give rise to the appearance of randomness, with empir-
ical distributions (Sections 7 and 10) in agreement with the predictions of the quantum
formalism.
From a general perspective, perhaps the most noteworthy consequence of our analysis
concerns absolute uncertainty (Section 11). In a universe governed by Bohmian me-
chanics there are sharp, precise, and irreducible limitations on the possibility of obtaining
knowledge, limitations which can in no way be diminished through technological progress
leading to better means of measurement.
This absolute uncertainty is in precise agreement with Heisenberg’s uncertainty princi-
ple. But while Heisenberg used uncertainty to argue for the meaninglessness of particle
trajectories, we find that, with Bohmian mechanics, absolute uncertainty arises as a ne-
cessity, emerging as a remarkably clean and simple consequence of the existence of tra-
jectories. Thus quantum uncertainty, regarded as an experimental fact, is explained by
Bohmian mechanics, rather than explained away as it is in orthodox quantum theory.
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Our analysis covers all of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. However, since our con-
cern here is mainly conceptual, we shall for concreteness and simplicity consider only
particles without spin, and shall ignore indistinguishability and the exclusion principle.
Spin and permutation symmetry arise naturally in Bohmian mechanics [2,30,13,46,35],
and an analysis explicitly taking them into account would differ from the one given here
in no essential way.
In fact, our analysis really depends only on rather general qualitative features of the
structure of abstract quantum theory, not on the details of any specific quantum theory—
such as nonrelativistic quantum mechanics or a quantum field theory. In particular, the
analysis does not require a particle ontology; a field ontology, for example, would do just
as well.
Our analysis is, however, fundamentally nonrelativistic. It may well be the case that
a fully relativistic generalization of the kind of physics explored here requires new con-
cepts [28,9,16,55]—if not new mathematical structures. But if one has not first understood
the nonrelativistic case, one could hardly know where to begin for the relativistic one.
Perhaps this paper should be read in the following spirit: In order to grasp the essence
of Quantum Theory, one must first completely understand at least one quantum theory.
2. Reality and the role of the wave function
For each measurement one is required to ascribe to the ψ-function a char-
acteristic, quite sudden change, which depends on the measurement result ob-
tained, and so cannot be forseen; from which alone it is already quite clear that
this second kind of change of the ψ-function has nothing whatever in common
with its orderly development between two measurements. The abrupt change by
measurement...is the most interesting point of the entire theory....For this reason
one can not put the ψ-function directly in place of...the physical thing...because
in the realism point of view observation is a natural process like any other and
cannot per se bring about an interruption of the orderly flow of natural events.
(Schro¨dinger [51])
The conventional wisdom that the wave function provides a complete description of a
quantum system is certainly an attractive possibility: other things being equal, monism—
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the view that there is but one kind of reality—is perhaps more alluring than pluralism. But
the problem of the origin of quantum randomness, described at the beginning of Section 1,
already suggests that other things are not, in fact, equal.
Moreover, wave function monism suffers from another serious defect, to which the prob-
lem of randomness is closely related: Schro¨dinger’s evolution tends to produce spreading
over configuration space, so that the wave function ψ of a macroscopic system will typi-
cally evolve to one supported by distinct, and vastly different, macroscopic configurations,
to a grotesque macroscopic superposition, even if ψ were originally quite prosaic. This is
precisely what happens during a measurement, over the course of which the wave function
describing the measurement process will become a superposition of components correspond-
ing to the various apparatus readings to which the quantum formalism assigns nonvanishing
probability. And the difficulty with this conception, of a world completely described by
such an exotic wave function, is not even so much that it is extravagantly bizarre, but
rather that this conception—or better our place in it, as well as that of the random events
which the quantum formalism is supposed to govern—is exceedingly obscure.3
What has just been said supports, not the impossibility of wave function monism, but
rather its incompatibility with the Schro¨dinger evolution. And the allure of wave function
monism is so strong that most interpretations of quantum mechanics in fact involve the
abrogation of Schro¨dinger’s equation. This abrogation is often merely implicit and, indeed,
is often presented as if it were compatible with the quantum dynamics. This is the case, for
example, when the measurement postulates, regarded as embodying “collapse of the wave
packet,” are simply combined with Schro¨dinger’s equation in the formulation of quantum
theory. The “measurement problem” is merely an expression of this inconsistency.
There have been several recent proposals—for example, by Wigner [63], by Leggett [42],
by Stapp [55], by Weinberg [57] and by Penrose [48]—suggesting explicitly that the quan-
tum evolution is not of universal validity, that under suitable conditions, encompassing
those which prevail during measurements, the evolution of the wave function is not gov-
erned by Schro¨dinger’s equation (see also [59]). A common suggestion is that the quantum
3What we have just described is often presented more colorfully as the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s cat [51].
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dynamics should be replaced by some sort of “nonlinear” (possibly nondeterministic) mod-
ification, to which, on the microscopic level, it is but an extremely good approximation.
One of the most concrete proposals along these lines is that of Ghirardi, Rimini, and
Weber [33].
The theory of GRW modifies Schro¨dinger’s equation by the incorporation of a random
“quantum jump,” to a macroscopically localized wave function. As an explanation of the
origin of quantum randomness it is thus not very illuminating, accounting, as it does, for
the randomness in a rather ad hoc manner, essentially by fiat. Nonetheless this theory
should be commended for its precision, and for the light it sheds on the relationship between
Lorentz invariance and nonlocality (see [9]).
A related, but more serious, objection to proposals for the modification of Schro¨dinger’s
equation is the following: The quantum evolution embodies a deep mathematical beauty,
which proclaims “Do not tamper! Don’t degrade my integrity!” Thus, in view of the
fact that (the relativistic extension of) Schro¨dinger’s equation, or, better, the quantum
theory, in which it plays so prominent a role, has been verified to a remarkable—and
unprecedented—degree, these proposals for the modification of the quantum dynamics ap-
pear at best dubious, based as they are on purely conceptual, philosophical considerations.
But is wave function monism really so compelling a conception that we must struggle
to retain it in the face of the formidable difficulties it entails? Certainly not! In fact, we
shall argue that even if there were no such difficulties, even in the case of “other things
being equal,” a strong case can be made for the superiority of pluralism.
According to (pre-quantum-mechanical) scientific precedent, when new mathematically
abstract theoretical entities are introduced into a theory, the physical significance of these
entities, their very meaning insofar as physics is concerned, arises from their dynamical
role, from the role they play in (governing) the evolution of the more primitive—more
familiar and less abstract—entities or dynamical variables. For example, in classical elec-
trodynamics the meaning of the electromagnetic field derives solely from the Lorentz force
equation, i.e., from the field’s role in governing the evolution of the positions of charged
particles, through the specification of the forces, acting upon these particles, to which
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the field gives rise; while in general relativity a similar statement can be made for the
gravitational metric tensor. That this should be so is rather obvious: Why would these
abstractions be introduced in the first place, if not for their relevance to the behavior of
something else, which somehow already has physical significance?
Indeed, it should perhaps be thought astonishing that the wave function was not also
introduced in this way—insofar as it is a field on configuration space rather than on physical
space, the wave function is an abstraction of even higher order than the electromagnetic
field.
But, in fact, it was! The concept of the wave function originated in 1924 with de
Broglie [24], who—intrigued by Einstein’s idea of the “Gespensterfeld”—proposed that just
as electromagnetic waves are somehow associated with particles, the photons, so should
material particles, in particular electrons, be accompanied by waves. He conceived of
these waves as “pilot waves,” somehow governing the motion of the associated particles in
a manner which he only later, in the late 1920’s, made explicit [25]. However, under an
onslaught of criticism by Pauli, he soon abandoned his pilot wave theory, only to return to
it more than two decades later, after his ideas had been rediscovered, extended, and vastly
refined by David Bohm [13,14].
Moreover, in a paper written shortly after Schro¨dinger invented wave mechanics, Born
too explored the hypothesis that the wave function might be a “guiding field” for the motion
of the electron [23]. As consequences of this hypothesis, Born was led in this paper both to
his statistical interpretation of the wave function and to the creation of scattering theory.
Born did not explicitly specify a guiding law, but he did insist that the wave function
should somehow determine the motion of the electron only statistically, that deterministic
guiding is impossible. And, like de Broglie, he later quickly abandoned the guiding field
hypothesis, in large measure owing to the unsympathetic reception of Heisenberg, who
insisted that physical theories be formulated directly in terms of observable quantities, like
spectral lines and intensities, rather than in terms of microscopic trajectories.
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can itself be regarded as giving
the wave function a role in the behavior of something else, namely of certain macroscopic
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objects, called “measurement instruments,” during “quantum measurements” [12,40]. In-
deed, the most modest attitude one could adopt towards quantum theory would appear to
be that of regarding it as a phenomenological formalism, roughly analogous to the thermo-
dynamic formalism, for the description of certain macroscopic regularities. But it should
nonetheless strike the reader as somewhat odd that the wave function, which appears to be
the fundamental theoretical entity of the fundamental theory of what we normally regard
as microscopic physics, should be assigned a role on the level of the macroscopic, itself an
imprecise notion, and specifically in terms, even less precise, of measurements, rather than
on the microscopic level.
Be that as it may, the modest position just described is not a stable one: It raises the
question of how this phenomenological formalism arises from the behavior of the micro-
scopic constituents of the macroscopic objects with which it is concerned. Indeed, this very
question, in the context of the thermodynamic formalism, led to the development of statis-
tical mechanics by Boltzmann and Gibbs, and, with some help from Einstein, eventually
to the (almost) universal acceptance of the atomic hypothesis.
Of course, the Copenhagen interpretation is not quite so modest. It goes further, in-
sisting upon the impossibility of just such an explanation of the (origin of the) quantum
formalism. On behalf of this claim—which is really quite astounding in that it raises to
a universal level the personal failure of a generation of physicists to find a satisfactory
objective description of microscopic processes—the arguments which have been presented
are not, in view of the rather dramatic conclusions that they are intended to establish,
as compelling as might have been expected. Nonetheless, the very acceptance of these
arguments by several generations of physicists should lead us to expect that, if not impos-
sible, it should at best be extraordinarily difficult to account for the quantum formalism
in objective microscopic terms.
Exhortations to the contrary notwithstanding, suppose that we do seek a microscopic
origin for the quantum formalism, and that we do this by trying to find a role on the
microscopic level for the wave function, relating it to the behavior of something else. How
are we to proceed? A modest proposal: First try the obvious! Then proceed to the less
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obvious and, as is likely to be necessary, eventually to the not-the-least-bit-obvious. We
shall implement this proposal here, and shall show that we need nothing but the obvious!4
What we regard as the obvious choice of primitive ontology—the basic kinds of entities
that are to be the building blocks of everything else5—should by now be clear: Particles,
described by their positions in space, changing with time—some of which, owing to the dy-
namical laws governing their evolution, perhaps combine to form the familiar macroscopic
objects of daily experience.
However, the specific role the wave function should play in governing the motion of the
particles is perhaps not so clear, but for this, too, we shall find that there is a rather obvious
choice, which when combined with Schro¨dinger’s equation becomes Bohmian mechanics.
(That an abstraction such as the wave function, for a many-particle system a field that
is not on physical space but on configuration space, should be a fundamental theoretical
entity in such a theory appears quite natural—as a compact expression of dynamical prin-
ciples governing an evolution of configurations .6)
3. Bohmian mechanics
...in physics the only observations we must consider are position observations, if
only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a great merit of the de Broglie-
Bohm picture to force us to consider this fact. If you make axioms, rather than
definitions and theorems, about the ‘measurement’ of anything else, then you
commit redundancy and risk inconsistency. (Bell [8])
Consider a quantum system of N particles, with masses m1, . . . , mN and position co-
ordinates q1, . . . ,qN , whose wave function ψ = ψ(q1, . . . ,qN , t) satisfies Schro¨dinger’s
4Insofar as nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is concerned.
5Except, of course, the wave function.
6However, with wave function monism, without such a role and, indeed, without particle positions
from which to form configurations, how can we make sense of a field on the space of configurations? We
might well ask “What configurations?” (And the wave function really is on configuration space—it is in
this representation that quantum mechanics assumes its simplest form!)
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equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
N∑
k=1
~
2
2mk
∆kψ + V ψ, (3.1)
where∆k = ∇k ·∇k =
∂2
∂qk
2 and V = V (q1, . . . ,qN ) is the potential energy of the system.
Suppose that the wave function ψ does not provide a complete description of the system,
that the most basic ingredient of the description of the state at a given time t is provided
by the positions q1, . . . ,qN of its particles at that time, and that the wave function governs
the evolution of (the positions of) these particles. Insofar as first derivatives are simpler
than higher derivatives, the simplest possibility would appear to be that the wave function
determine the velocities vψ1 , . . . ,v
ψ
N of all the particles. Here v
ψ
k ≡ v
ψ
k (q1, . . . ,qN ) is a
velocity vector field, on configuration space, for the k-th particle, i.e.,
dqk
dt
= vψk (q1, . . . ,qN ). (3.2)
Since (3.1) and (3.2) are first order differential equations, it would then follow that the
state of the system is indeed given by ψ and q ≡ (q1, . . . ,qN )—the specification of these
variables at any time would determine them at all times.
Since two wave functions of which one is a nonzero constant multiple of the other should
be physically equivalent, we demand that vψk be homogeneous of degree 0 as a function of
ψ,
v
cψ
k = v
ψ
k (3.3)
for any constant c 6= 0.
In order to arrive at a form for vψk we shall use symmetry as our main guide. Consider
first a single free particle of mass m, whose wave function ψ(q) satisfies the free Schro¨dinger
equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
~
2
2m
∆ψ. (3.4)
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We wish to choose vψ in such a way that the system of equations given by (3.4) and
dq
dt
= vψ(q) (3.5)
is Galilean and time-reversal invariant.7 Rotation invariance, with the requirement that
vψ be homogeneous of degree 0, yields the form
vψ = α
∇ψ
ψ
,
where α is a constant scalar, as the simplest possibility.
This form will not in general be real, so that we should perhaps take real or imaginary
parts. Time-reversal is implemented on ψ by the involution ψ → ψ∗ of complex conju-
gation, which renders Schro¨dinger’s equation time reversal invariant. If the full system,
including (3.5), is also to be time-reversal invariant, we must thus have that
vψ
∗
= −vψ, (3.6)
which selects the form
vψ = α Im
∇ψ
ψ
(3.7)
with α real.
Moreover the constant α is determined by requiring full Galilean invariance: Since vψ
must transform like a velocity under boosts, which are implemented on wave functions by
ψ 7→ ei
m
~
v0·qψ, invariance under boosts requires that α = ~m , so that (3.7) becomes
vψ =
~
m
Im
∇ψ
ψ
. (3.8)
7Note that a first-order (Aristotelian) Galilean invariant theory of particle motion may appear to be
an oxymoron.
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For a general N -particle system, with general potential energy V , we define the velocity
vector field by requiring (3.8) for each particle, i.e., by letting
v
ψ
k =
~
mk
Im
∇kψ
ψ
, (3.9)
so that (3.2) becomes
dqk
dt
=
~
mk
Im
∇kψ
ψ
(q1, . . . ,qN ). (3.10)
We’ve arrived at Bohmian mechanics: for our system of N particles the state is given
by
(q, ψ) (3.11)
and the evolution by
dqk
dt
=
~
mk
Im
∇kψ
ψ
(q1, . . . ,qN )
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
N∑
k=1
~
2
2mk
∆kψ + V ψ.
(3.12)
We note that Bohmian mechanics is time-reversal invariant, and that it is Galilean
invariant whenever V has this property, e.g., when V is the sum of a pair interaction of
the usual form,
V (q1, . . . ,qN ) =
∑
i<j
φ(|qi − qj |). (3.13)
However, our analysis will not depend on the form of V .
Note also that Bohmian mechanics depends only upon the Riemannian structure g =
(gij) = (miδij) defined by the masses of the particles: In terms of this Riemannian struc-
ture, the evolution equations (3.1) and (3.10) of Bohmian mechanics become
dq
dt
= ~ Im
gradψ
ψ
(q)
i~
∂ψ
∂t
= −
~
2
2
∆ψ + V ψ,
(3.14)
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where q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) is the configuration, and ∆ and grad are, respectively, the Laplace-
Beltrami operator and the gradient on the configuration space equipped with this Riemann-
ian structure.
While Bohmian mechanics shares Schro¨dinger’s equation with the usual quantum for-
malism, it might appear that they have little else in common. After all, the former is a
theory of particles in motion, albeit of an apparently highly nonclassical, non-Newtonian
character; while the observational content of the latter derives from a calculus of noncom-
muting “observables,” usually regarded as implying radical epistemological innovations.
Indeed, if the coefficient in the first equation of (3.12) were other than ~mk , i.e., for gen-
eral constants αk, the corresponding theory would have little else in common with the
quantum formalism. But for the particular choice of αk, of the coefficient in (3.12), which
defines Bohmian mechanics, the quantum formalism itself emerges as a phenomenological
consequence of this theory.
What makes the choice αk =
~
mk
special—apart from Galilean invariance, which plays
little or no role in the remainder of this paper—is that with this value, the probability
distribution on configuration space given by |ψ(q)|
2
possesses the property of equivariance,
a concept to which we now turn.
Note well that ψ on the right hand side of (3.2) or (3.10) is a solution to Schro¨dinger’s
equation (3.1) and is thus time-dependent, ψ = ψ(t). It follows that the vector field vψk ,
the right hand side of (3.10), will in general be (explicitly) time-dependent. Therefore,
given a solution ψ to Schro¨dinger’s equation, we cannot in general expect the evolution
on configuration space defined by (3.10) to possess a stationary probability distribution,
an object which very frequently plays an important role in the analysis of a dynamical
system.
However, the distribution given by |ψ(q)|
2
plays a role similar to that of—and for all
practical purposes is just as good as—a stationary one: Under the evolution ρ(q, t) of
probability densities, of ensemble densities, arising from (3.10), given by the continuity
14
equation
∂ρ
∂t
+ div(ρvψ) = 0 (3.15)
with vψ = (vψ1 , . . . ,v
ψ
N ) the configuration space velocity arising from ψ and div the di-
vergence on configuration space, the density ρ = |ψ|
2
is stationary relative to ψ, i.e., ρ(t)
retains its form as a functional of ψ(t). In other words,
if ρ(q, t0) = |ψ(q, t0)|
2
at some time t0, then ρ(q, t) = |ψ(q, t)|
2
for all t. (3.16)
We say that such a distribution is equivariant.8
To see that |ψ|
2
is, in fact, equivariant observe that
Jψ = |ψ|
2
vψ (3.17)
where Jψ = (Jψ1 , . . . ,J
ψ
N ) is the quantum probability current,
J
ψ
k =
~
2imk
(ψ∗∇kψ − ψ∇kψ
∗); (3.18)
thus ρ(q, t) = |ψ(q, t)|
2
satisfies (3.15).
Now consider a quantum measurement, involving an interaction between a system “un-
der observation” and an apparatus which performs the “observation.” Let ψ be the wave
function and q = (qsys, qapp) the configuration of the composite system of system and ap-
paratus. Suppose that prior to the measurement, at time ti, q is random, with probability
8More generally, and more precisely, we say that a functional ψ → µψ, from wave functions to finite
measures on configuration space, is equivariant if the diagram
ψ −−−−−→ µψ
Ut
y yFψt
ψt −−−−−→ µψt
is commutative, where Ut = e
−
i
~
tH , with Hamiltonian H = −
∑N
k=1
~
2
2mk
∆kψ+ V ψ, is the solution map
for Schro¨dinger’s equation and Fψt is the solution map for the natural evolution on measures which arises
from (3.10), with initial wave function ψ. (Fψt (µ) is the measure to which µ evolves in t units of time
when the initial wave function is ψ.)
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distribution given by ρ(q, ti) = |ψ(q, ti)|
2
. When the measurement has been completed,
at time tf , the configuration at this time will, of course, still be random, as will typically
be the outcome of the measurement, as given by appropriate apparatus variables, for ex-
ample, by the orientation of a pointer on a dial or by the pattern of ink marks on paper.
Moreover, by equivariance, the distribution of the configuration q at time tf will be given
by ρ(q, tf) = |ψ(q, tf)|
2
, in agreement with the prediction of the quantum formalism for
the distribution of q at this time. In particular, Bohmian mechanics and the quantum
formalism then agree on the statistics for the outcome of the measurement.9
4. The problem of quantum equilibrium
Then for instantaneous macroscopic configurations the pilot-wave theory gives
the same distribution as the orthodox theory, insofar as the latter is unambigu-
ous. However, this question arises: what is the good of either theory, giving
distributions over a hypothetical ensemble (of worlds!) when we have only one
world. (Bell [7])
Suppose a system has wave function ψ. We shall call the probability distribution on
configuration space given by ρ = |ψ|
2
the quantum equilibrium distribution. And we
shall say that a system is in quantum equilibrium when its coordinates are “randomly
distributed” according to the quantum equilibrium distribution. As we have seen, when
a system and apparatus are in quantum equilibrium the results of “measurement” arising
from the interaction between system and apparatus will conform with the predictions of
the quantum formalism for such a measurement.
More precisely(!), we say that a system is in quantum equilibrium when the quantum
equilibrium distribution is appropriate for its description. It is a major goal of this paper to
9This argument appears to leave open the possibility of disagreement when the outcome of the mea-
surement is not configurationally grounded, i.e., when the apparatus variables which express this outcome
are not functions of qapp. However, the reader should recall Bohr’s insistence that the outcome of a mea-
surement be describable in classical terms, as well as note that results of measurements must always be
at least potentially grounded configurationally, in the sense that we can arrange that they be recorded in
configurational terms without affecting the result. Otherwise we could hardly regard the process leading
to the original result as a completed measurement.
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explain what exactly this might mean and to show that, indeed, when understood properly,
it is typically the case that systems are in quantum equilibrium. In other words, our goal
here is to clarify and justify the quantum equilibrium hypothesis:
When a system has wave function ψ, the distribution ρ of its coordinates satisfies
ρ = |ψ|
2
. (4.1)
We shall do this in the later sections of this paper. In the rest of this section we will
elaborate on the problem of quantum equilibrium.
From a dynamical systems perspective, it would appear natural to attempt to jus-
tify (4.1) using such notions as “convergence to equilibrium,” “mixing,” or “ergodicity”—
suitably generalized. And if it were in fact necessary to establish such properties for
Bohmian mechanics in order to justify the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, we could not
reasonably expect to succeed, at least not with any degree of rigor. The problem of es-
tablishing good ergodic properties for nontrivial dynamical systems is extremely difficult,
even for highly simplified, less than realistic, models.
It might seem that Bohmian mechanics rather trivially fails to possess good ergodic
properties, if one considers the motion arising from the standard energy eigenstates of fa-
miliar systems. However, quantum systems attain such simple wave functions only through
complex interactions, for example with an apparatus during a measurement or prepara-
tion procedure, during which time they are not governed by a simple wave function. Thus
the question of the ergodic properties of Bohmian mechanics refers to the motion under
generic, more complex, wave functions.
We shall show, however, that establishing such properties is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for our purposes: That it is not necessary follows from the analysis in the later
sections of this paper, and that it would not be sufficient follows from the discussion to
which we now turn.
The reader may wonder why the quantum equilibrium hypothesis should present any
difficulty at all. Why can we not regard it as an additional postulate, on say initial
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conditions (in analogy with equilibrium statistical mechanics, where the Gibbs distribution
is often uncritically accepted as axiomatic)? Then, by equivariance, it will be preserved by
the dynamics, so that we obtain the quantum equilibrium hypothesis for all times. In fact,
when all is said and done, we shall find that this is an adequate description of the situation
provided the quantum equilibrium hypothesis is interpreted in the appropriate way . But
for the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as so far formulated, such an account would be
grossly inadequate.
Note first that the quantum equilibrium hypothesis relates objects belonging to rather
different conceptual categories: The right hand side of (4.1) refers to a dynamical object,
which from the perspective of Bohmian mechanics is of a thoroughly objective character;
while the left refers to a probability distribution—an object whose physical significance
remains mildly obscure and moderately controversial, and which often is regarded as having
a strongly subjective aspect. Thus, some explanation or justification is called for.
One very serious difficulty with (4.1) is that it seems to be demonstrably false in a
great many situations. For example, the wave function—of system and apparatus—after a
measurement (arising from Schro¨dinger’s equation) is supported by the set of all configu-
rations corresponding to the possible outcomes of the measurement, while the probability
distribution at this time is supported only by those configurations corresponding to the
actual outcome, e.g., given by a specific pointer position, a main point of measurement
being to obtain the information upon which this probability distribution is grounded.
This difficulty is closely related to an ambiguity in the domain of physical applicability
of Bohmian mechanics. In order to avoid inconsistency we must regard Bohmian mechan-
ics as describing the entire universe, i.e., our system should consist of all particles in the
universe: The behavior of parts of the universe, of subsystems of interest, must arise from
the behavior of the whole, evolving according to Bohmian mechanics. It turns out, as we
shall show, that subsystems are themselves, in fact, frequently governed by Bohmian me-
chanics. But if we postulate that subsystems must obey Bohmian mechanics, we “commit
redundancy and risk inconsistency.”
Note also that the very nature of our concerns—the origin and justification of (local)
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randomness—forces us to consider the universal level: Local systems are not (always and
are never entirely) isolated. Recall that cosmological considerations similarly arise in
connection with the problem of the origin of irreversibility (see R. Penrose [49]).
Thus, strictly speaking, for Bohmian mechanics only the universe has a wave function,
since the complete state of an N particle universe at any time is given by its wave function
ψ and the configuration q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) of its particles. Therefore the right hand side of
the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (4.1) is also obscure as soon as it refers to a system
smaller than the entire universe—and the systems to which (4.1) is normally applied are
very small indeed, typically microscopic.
Suppose, as suggested earlier, we consider (4.1) for the entire universe. Then the right
hand side is clear, but the left is completely obscure: Focus on (4.1) for THE INITIAL
TIME. What physical significance can be assigned to a probability distribution on the
initial configurations for the entire universe? What can be the relevance to physics of such
an ensemble of universes? After all, we have at our disposal only the particular, actual
universe of which we are a part. Thus, even if we could make sense of the right hand side
of (4.1), and in such a way that (4.1) remains a consequence of the quantum equilibrium
hypothesis at THE INITIAL TIME, we would still be far from our goal, appearances to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Since the inadequacy of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis regarded as describing an
ensemble of universes is a crucial point, we wish to elaborate. For each choice of initial
universal wave function ψ and configuration q, a “history”—past, present, and future—is
completely determined. In particular, the results of all experiments, including quantum
measurements, are determined.
Consider an ensemble of universes initially satisfying (4.1), and suppose that it can
be shown that for this ensemble the outcome of a particular experiment is randomly dis-
tributed with distribution given by the quantum formalism. This would tell us only that
if we were to repeat the very same experiment—whatever this might mean—many times,
sampling from our ensemble of universes, we would obtain the desired distribution. But
this is both impossible and devoid of physical significance: While we can perform many
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similar experiments, differing, however, at the very least, by location or time, we cannot
perform the very same experiment more than once.
What we need to know about, if we are to make contact with physics, is empirical
distributions—actual relative frequencies within an ensemble of actual events—arising from
repetitions of similar experiments, performed at different places or times, within a single
sample of the universe—the one we are in. In other words, what is physically relevant
is not sampling across an ensemble of universes—across (initial) q’s—but sampling across
space and time within a single universe, corresponding to a fixed (initial) q (and ψ).
Thus, to demonstrate the compatibility of Bohmian mechanics with the predictions of
the quantum formalism, we must show that for at least some choice of initial universal ψ
and q, the evolution (3.12) leads to an apparently random pattern of events, with empirical
distribution given by the quantum formalism. In fact, we show much more.
We prove that for every initial ψ, this agreement with the predictions of the quantum
formalism is obtained for typical—i.e., for the overwhelming majority of—choices of initial
q. And the sense of typicality here is with respect to the only mathematically natural—
because equivariant—candidate at hand, namely, quantum equilibrium.
Thus, on the universal level, the physical significance of quantum equilibrium is as a
measure of typicality, and the ultimate justification of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis
is, as we shall show, in terms of the statistical behavior arising from a typical initial
configuration.
According to the usual understanding of the quantum formalism, when a system has
wave function ψ, (4.1) is satisfied regardless of whatever additional information we might
have. When we claim to have established agreement between Bohmian mechanics and the
predictions of the quantum formalism, we mean to include this statement among those
predictions. We are thus claiming to have established that in a universe governed by
Bohmian mechanics it is in principle impossible to know more about the configuration
of any subsystem than what is expressed by (4.1)—despite the fact that for Bohmian
mechanics the actual configuration is an objective property, beyond the wave function.
This may appear to be an astonishing claim, particularly since it refers to knowledge, a
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concept both vague and problematical, in an essential way. More astonishing still is this:
This uncertainty, of an absolute and precise character, emerges with complete ease, the
structure of Bohmian mechanics being such that it allows for the formulation and clean
demonstration of statistical statements of a purely objective character which nonetheless
imply our claims concerning the irreducible limitations on possible knowledge whatever this
“knowledge” may precisely mean, and however we might attempt to obtain this knowledge,
provided it is consistent with Bohmian mechanics. We shall therefore call this limitation
on what can be known absolute uncertainty .
5. The effective wave function
No one can understand this theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real ob-
jective field rather than just a ‘probability amplitude.’ Even though it propagates
not in 3-space but in 3N -space. (Bell [7])
We now commence our more detailed analysis of the behavior of an N -particle non-
relativistic universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, focusing in this section on the notion
of the effective wave function of a subsystem. We begin with some notation.
We shall use Ψ as the variable for the universal wave function, reserving ψ for the
effective wave function of a subsystem, the definition and clarification of which is the aim
of this section. By Ψt we shall denote the universal wave function at time t. We shall use
q = (q1, . . . ,qN ) as the generic configuration space variable, which, to avoid confusion, we
shall usually distinguish from the actual configuration of the particles, for which we shall
usually use capitals. Thus we shall write Ψ = Ψ(q) and shall denote the configuration of
the universe at time t by Qt.
We remind the reader that according to Bohmian mechanics the state (Qt,Ψt) of the
universe at time t evolves via
dQt
dt
= vΨt(Qt)
i~
dΨt
dt
= −
N∑
k=1
~
2
2mk
∆kΨt + VΨt,
(5.1)
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where vΨ = (vΨ1 , . . . ,v
Ψ
N ) with v
Ψ
k defined by (3.9).
For any given subsystem of particles we obtain a splitting
q = (x, y), (5.2)
with x the generic variable for the configuration of the subsystem and y the generic variable
for the configuration of the complementary subsystem, formed by the particles not in the
given subsystem. We shall call the given subsystem the x-system, and we shall sometimes
call its complement—the y-system—the environment of the x-system.10
Of course, for any splitting (5.2) we have a splitting
Q = (X, Y ) (5.3)
for the actual configuration. And for the wave function Ψ we may write Ψ = Ψ(x, y).
Frequently the subsystem of interest naturally decomposes into smaller subsystems. For
example, we may have
x = (xsys, xapp), (5.4)
for the composite formed by system and apparatus, or
x = (x1, . . . , xM), (5.5)
for the composite formed fromM disjoint subsystems. And, of course, any of the xi in (5.5)
could be of the form (5.4).
Consider now a subsystem with associated splitting (5.2). We wish to explore the
circumstances under which we may reasonably regard this subsystem as “itself having
a wave function.” This will serve as motivation for our definition of the effective wave
10While we have in mind the situation in which the x-system consists of a set of particles selected by
their labels, what we say would not be (much) affected if the x-system consisted, say, of all particles in a
given region. In fact the splitting (5.2) could be more general than one based upon what we would normally
regard as a division into complementary systems of particles; for example, the x-system might include the
center of mass of some collection of particles, while the y-system includes the relative coordinates for this
collection.
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function of this subsystem. To this end, suppose first that the universal wave function
factorizes so that
Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y). (5.6)
Then we obtain the splitting
vΨ = (vψ, vΦ), (5.7)
and, in particular, we have that
dX
dt
= vψ(X) (5.8)
for as long as (5.6) is satisfied. Moreover, to the extent that the interaction between the
x-system and its environment can be ignored, i.e., that the Hamiltonian
H = −
N∑
k=1
~
2
2mk
∆k + V (5.9)
in (5.1) can be regarded as being of the form
H = H(x) +H(y) (5.10)
where H(x) and H(y) are the contributions to H arising from terms involving only the par-
ticle coordinates of the x-system, respectively, the y-system11, the form (5.6) is preserved
by the evolution, with ψ, in particular, evolving via
i~
dψ
dt
= H(x)ψ. (5.11)
It must be emphasized, however, that the factorization (5.6) is extremely unphysical.
After all, interactions between system and environment, which tend to destroy the fac-
torization (5.6), are commonplace. In particular, they occur whenever a measurement is
11The sense of the approximation expressed by (5.10) is somewhat delicate. In particular, (5.10) should
not be regarded as a condition on H (or V ) so much as a condition on (the supports of) the factors ψ and
Φ of the wave function Ψ whose evolution is governed by H; namely, that these supports be sufficiently
well separated so that all contributions to V involving both particle coordinates in the support of ψ and
particle coordinates in the support of Φ are so small that they can be neglected when H is applied to such
a Ψ.
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performed on the x-system. Thus, the universal wave function Ψ should now be of an ex-
tremely complex form, involving intricate “quantum correlations” between x-system and
y-system, however simple it may have been originally!
Note, however, that if
Ψ = Ψ(1) +Ψ(2) (5.12)
with the wave functions on the right having (approximately12) disjoint supports, then
(approximately)
vΨ(Q) = vΨ
(i)
(Q) (5.13)
for Q in the support of Ψ(i). Of course, by mere linearity, if Ψ is of the form (5.12) at
some time τ , it will be of the same form
Ψt = Ψ
(1)
t +Ψ
(2)
t (5.14)
for all t, where Ψ
(i)
t is the solution agreeing with Ψ
(i) at time τ of the second equation
of (5.1). Moreover, if the supports of Ψ(1) and Ψ(2) are “sufficiently disjoint” at this
time, we should expect the approximate disjointness of these supports, and hence the
approximate validity of (5.13), to persist for a “substantial” amount of time.
Finally, we note that according to orthodox quantum measurement theory [56,12,60,62],
after a measurement, or preparation, has been performed on a quantum system, the wave
function for the composite formed by system and apparatus is of the form
∑
α
ψα ⊗ φα (5.15)
with the different φα supported by the macroscopically distinct (sets of) configurations
corresponding to the various possible outcomes of the measurement, e.g., given by appa-
ratus pointer positions. Of course, for Bohmian mechanics the terms of (5.15) are not all
12in an appropriate sense, of course. Note in this regard that the simplest metrics d on the projective
space of rays {cΨ} are of the form d(Ψ,Ψ′) = ‖∇Ψ
Ψ
− ∇Ψ
′
Ψ′
‖, where “‖ ‖” is a norm on the space of complex
vector fields on configuration space. Moreover the metric d is preserved by the space-time symmetries
(when “‖ ‖” is translation and rotation invariant).
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on the same footing: one of them, and only one, is selected, or more precisely supported,
by the outcome—corresponding, say, to α0—which actually occurs. To emphasize this we
may write (5.15) in the form
ψ ⊗ φ+ Ψ⊥ (5.16)
where ψ = ψα0 , φ = φα0 , and Ψ
⊥ =
∑
α 6=α0
ψα ⊗ φα.
Motivated by these observations, we say that a subsystem, with associated splitting (5.2),
has effective wave function ψ (at a given time) if the universal wave function Ψ = Ψ(x, y)
and the actual configuration Q = (X, Y ) (at that time) satisfy
Ψ(x, y) = ψ(x)Φ(y) + Ψ⊥(x, y) (5.17)
with Φ and Ψ⊥ having macroscopically disjoint y-supports, and
Y ∈ suppΦ. (5.18)
Here, by the macroscopic disjointness of the y-supports of Φ and Ψ⊥ we mean not only
that their supports are disjoint but that there is a macroscopic function of y—think, say, of
the orientation of a pointer—whose values for y in the support of Φ differ by a macroscopic
amount from its values for y in the support of Ψ⊥.
The reader familiar with quantum measurement theory should convince himself (see (5.15)
and (5.16)) that our definition of effective wave function coincides with the usual practice
of the quantum formalism in ascribing wave functions to systems whenever the latter does
assign a wave function. In particular, whenever a system has a wave function for orthodox
quantum theory, it has an effective wave function for Bohmian mechanics.13 However,
there may well be situations in which a system has an effective wave function according
to Bohmian mechanics, but the standard quantum formalism has nothing to say. (We say
13Note that the x-system will not have an effective wave function—even approximately—when, for
example, it belongs to a larger microscopic system whose effective wave function does not factorize in the
appropriate way. Note also that the larger the environment of the x-system, the greater is the potential
for the existence of an effective wave function for this system, owing in effect to the greater abundance
of “measurement-like” interactions with a larger environment (see, for example, Point 20 of the Appendix
and the references therein).
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“may well be” because the usual quantum formalism is too imprecise and too controversial
insofar as these questions—for which “collapse of the wave packet” must in some ill-defined
manner be invoked—are concerned to allow for a more definite statement.) Readers who
are not familiar with quantum measurement theory can—as a consequence of our later
analysis—simply replace whatever vague notion they may have of the wave function of a
system with the more precise notion of effective wave function.
Despite the slight vagueness in the definition of effective wave function, arising from its
reference to the imprecise notion of the macroscopic, the effective wave function, when it
exists, is unambiguous. In fact, it is given by14 the conditional wave function
ψ(x) = Ψ(x, Y ), (5.19)
which, moreover, is (almost) always defined (assuming continuity, which, of course, we
must). In fact, the main result of this paper, concerning the statistical properties of
subsystems, remains valid when the notion of effective wave function is replaced by the
completely precise, and less restrictive, formulation provided by the conditional wave func-
tion (5.19).15
Note that by virtue of the first equation of (5.1), the velocity vector field for the x-system
is generated by its conditional wave function. However, the conditional wave function will
not in general evolve (even approximately) according to Schro¨dinger’s equation, even when
the x-system is dynamically decoupled from its environment. Thus (5.19) by itself lacks
the central dynamical implications, as suggested by the preliminary discussion, of our
definition (5.17), (5.18). And it is of course from these dynamical implications that the
wave function of a system derives much of its physical significance.16
14We identify wave functions related by a nonzero constant factor.
15We therefore need not be be too concerned here by the fact that our definition is also somewhat
unrealistic, in the sense that in situations where we would in practice say that a system has wave function
ψ, the terms on the right hand side of (5.17) are only approximately disjoint, or, what amounts to the
same thing, the first term on the right is only approximately of the product from, though to an enormously
good degree of approximation.
16In this regard note the following: Let WY (x) = VI (x, Y ), where VI is the contribution to V arising
from the terms which represent interactions between the x-system and the y-system, i.e., H = Hx+H(y)+
VI . Suppose that W
Y does not depend upon Y for Y in the support of Φ, WY = W for Y ∈ suppΦ.
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Note well that the notion of effective wave function, or conditional wave function, is
made possible by the existence of the actual configuration Q = (X, Y ) as well as Ψ! (In
particular, the effective—or conditional—wave function is objective, while a related notion
in Everett’s Many-Worlds or Relative State interpretation of quantum theory [26] is merely
relative.17) Note also that the conditional wave function is the function of x most naturally
arising from Ψ and Y .18
We emphasize that the effective wave function—as well as the conditional wave function—
is, like any honest to goodness attribute or objective property, a functional of state de-
scription, here a function-valued functional of Ψ and Q = (X, Y ) which depends on Q only
through Y . We shall sometimes write
ψ = ψY,Ψ (5.20)
to emphasize this relationship. For the conditional or effective wave function at time t we
shall sometimes write
ψt = ψ
Yt,Ψt ≡ ψYtt , (5.21)
suppressing the dependence upon Ψ.
Note that though we speak of ψ as a property of the x-system, it depends not upon the
coordinates of the x-system but only upon the environment, a distinctly peculiar situation
from a classical perspective. In fact, it is precisely because of this that the effective wave
function behaves like a degree of freedom for the x-system which is independent of its
configuration X .
Then the effective wave function ψ satisfies i~
dψ
dt
= (H(x) +W )ψ. The reader should think, for example,
of a gas confined by the walls of a box, or of a particle moving among obstacles. The interaction of the gas
or the particle with the walls or the obstacles—which after all are part of the environment—is expressed
thru W .
17For an incisive critique of the Many-Worlds interpretation, as well as a detailed comparison with
Bohmian mechanics, see Bell [4,7].
18For particles with spin our definition (5.17), (5.18) needs no essential modification. However, (5.19)
would have to be replaced by Ψ(x, Y ) = ψ(x)⊗Φ, where “⊗” here denotes the tensor product over the spin
degrees of freedom. In particular, for particles with spin, a subsystem need not have even a conditional
wave function.
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Consider now a composite x = (x1, . . . , xM) of microscopic subsystems, withM not too
large, i.e., not “macroscopically large.” Suppose that (simultaneously) each xi-system has
effective wave function ψi. Then the x-system has effective wave function
ψ(x) = ψ1(x1)ψ2(x2) · · ·ψM (xM ), (5.22)
in agreement with the quantum formalism.19 To see this, note that for each i we have that
Ψ = ψi(xi)Φi(yi) + Ψ
⊥
i (xi, yi) (5.23)
with Φi and Ψ
⊥
i having macroscopically disjoint yi-supports and hence, because the xi-
systems are microscopic, having disjoint y-supports as well.20 Moreover,
Y ∈ suppΦ1 ∩ suppΦ2 ∩ · · · ∩ suppΦM , (5.24)
and for all such Y we have
Ψ(x1, . . . , xM , Y ) = ψi(xi)Φi(xˆi, Y ) (5.25)
for all i, where xˆi = (x1, . . . , xM) with xi missing. It follows by separation of variables,
writing
Ψ(x, Y ) = ψ1(x1) · · ·ψM (xM )Φ(x, Y ) (5.26)
and dividing by
∏
i ψi, that for Y satisfying (5.24)
Ψ(x, Y ) = ψ1(x1) · · ·ψM (xM )Φ(Y ) (5.27)
19As far as the quantum formalism is concerned, recall that from a purely operational perspective,
whatever procedure simultaneously prepares each system in the corresponding quantum state is a prepa-
ration of the product state for the composite. Moreover, an analysis of such a simultaneous preparation
in terms of quantum measurement theory would, of course, lead to the same conclusion. Note also that if
the x-system is described by a density matrix whose reduced density matrix for each xi-system is given by
the wave function ψi, then this density matrix is itself, in fact, given by the corresponding product wave
function.
20It is at this point that the condition that M not be “too large”—so large that x can be used to form
a macroscopic variable—becomes relevant. And while the problematical situation which worries us here
may seem far fetched, it is not as far fetched as it initially might appear to be. It may be that SQUIDs,
superconducting quantum interference devices, can be regarded as giving rise to a situation just like the
one with which we are concerned, in which lots of microscopic systems have, say, the same effective wave
function, but the composite does not have the corresponding product as effective wave function. See,
however, the comment following the proof of (5.22).
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and, indeed, that the x-system has an effective wave function, given by the product (5.22).
Note that this result would not in general be valid for conditional wave functions. In
fact, the derivation of (5.22), which is used for the equal-time analysis of Section 7, is the
only place where more than (5.19) is required for our results, and even here only the more
precise consequence (5.25) is needed. Moreover, our more general, multitime analysis (see
Sections 8–10) does not appeal to (5.22) and requires only (5.19).
We wish to point out that while the qualifications under which we have established (5.22)
are so mild that in practice they exclude almost nothing, (5.22) is nonetheless valid in much
greater generality. In fact, whenever it is “known” that the subsystems have the ψi as their
respective effective wave functions—by investigators, by devices, or by any records or traces
whatsoever—insofar as this “knowledge” is grounded in the environment of the composite
system, i.e., is reflected in y, (5.22) follows without further qualification.
Nonetheless, in order better to appreciate the significance of the qualification “micro-
scopic” for (5.22), the reader should consider the following unrealistic but instructive ex-
ample: Consider a pair of macroscopic systems with the composite system having effective
wave function ψ(x) = ψL(x1)ψL(x2) + ψR(x1)ψR(x2), where ψL is a wave function sup-
ported by configurations in which a macroscopic coordinate is “on the left,” and similarly
for ψR. Suppose that X1 and X2 are “on the left.” Then each system has effective wave
function ψL.
What wave function would the quantum formalism assign to, say, system 1 in the
previous example? Though we can imagine many responses, we believe that the best answer
is, perhaps, that while the quantum formalism is for all practical purposes unambiguous, we
are concerned here with one of those “impractical purposes” for which the usual quantum
formalism is not sufficiently precise to allow us to make any definite statement on its behalf.
In this regard, see Bell [11].
We shall henceforth often say “wave function” instead of “effective wave function.”
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6. The fundamental conditional probability formula
The intellectual attractiveness of a mathematical argument, as well as the
considerable mental labor involved in following it, makes mathematics a pow-
erful tool of intellectual prestidigitation—a glittering deception in which some
are entrapped, and some, alas, entrappers. Thus, for instance, the delicious
ingenuity of the Birkhoff ergodic theorem has created the general impression
that it must play a central role in the foundations of statistical mechanics....
The Birkhoff theorem does us the service of establishing its own inability to
be more than a questionably relevant superstructure upon [the] hypothesis [of
absolute continuity]. (Schwartz [53])
We are ready to begin the detailed analysis of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (4.1).
We shall find that by employing, purely as a mathematical device, the quantum equilibrium
distribution on the universal scale, at, say, THE INITIAL TIME, we obtain the quantum
equilibrium hypothesis in the sense of empirical distributions for all scales at all times.
The key ingredient in the analysis is an elementary conditional probability formula.
Let us now denote the initial universal wave function by Ψ0 and the initial universal
configuration by Q, and for definiteness let us take THE INITIAL TIME to be t = 0.
For the purposes of our analysis we shall regard Ψ0 as fixed and Q as random. More
precisely, for given fixed Ψ0 we equip the space Q = {Q} of initial configurations with
the quantum equilibrium probability distribution P(dQ) = PΨ0(dQ) = |Ψ0(Q)|
2
dQ. Qt is
then a random variable on the probability space {Q,P}, since it is determined via (5.1) by
the initial condition given by Q0 = Q and Ψ0. Thus, for any subsystem, with associated
splitting (5.2), Xt, Yt, and ψt are also random variables on {Q,P}, where Qt = (Xt, Yt)
is the splitting of Qt arising from (5.2), and ψt is the (conditional) wave function of the
x-system at time t (see equation (5.21)).21
We wish again to emphasize that, taking into account the discussion in Section 4,
we regard the quantum equilibrium distribution P, at least for the time being, solely
21The reader may wonder why we don’t also treat Ψ0 as random. First of all, we don’t have to—we
are able to establish our results for every initial Ψ0, without having to invoke in any way any randomness
in Ψ0. Moreover, if it had proven necessary to invoke randomness in Ψ0, the results so obtained would be
of dubious physical significance, since to account for the nonequilibrium character of our world, the initial
wave function must be a nonequilibrium, i.e., “atypical,” wave function. See the discussion in Sections
12–14.
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as a mathematical device, facilitating the extraction of empirical statistical regularities
from Bohmian mechanics22, and otherwise devoid of physical significance. (However, as
a consequence of our analysis, the reader, if he so wishes, can safely also regard P as
providing a measure of subjective probability for the initial configuration Q.23)
Note that by equivariance the distribution of the random variable Qt is given by |Ψt|
2
.
It thus follows directly from (5.17), and even more directly from (5.19), that for the condi-
tional probability distribution of the configuration of a subsystem, given the configuration
of its environment, we have the fundamental conditional probability formula24
P(Xt ∈ dx|Yt) = |ψt(x)|
2dx, (6.1)
where ψt = ψ
Yt
t is the (conditional) wave function of the subsystem at time t. In par-
ticular, this conditional distribution on the configuration of a subsystem depends on the
configuration of its environment only through its wave function—an object of quite inde-
pendent dynamical significance. In other words, Xt and Yt are conditionally independent
given ψt. The entire empirical statistical content of Bohmian mechanics flows from (6.1)
with remarkable ease.
We wish to emphasize that (6.1) involves conditioning on the detailed microscopic config-
uration of the environment—far more information than could ever be remotely accessible.
Thus (6.1) is extremely strong. Note that it implies in particular that
P(Xt ∈ dx|ψt) = |ψt(x)|
2dx, (6.2)
which involves conditioning on what we would be minimally expected to know if we were
testing Born’s statistical law (4.1). However, it would be very peculiar to know only this—
to know no more than the wave function of the system of interest. But (6.1) suggests—and
we shall show, see Section 11—that whatever additional information we might have can
22in a manner roughly analagous to the use of ergodicity in deriving the pointwise behavior of time
averages for dynamical systems.
23After all, P could in fact be somebody’s subjective probability for Q.
24ψ is to be understood as normalized whenever we write |ψ|2.
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be of no relevance whatsoever to the possible value of Xt.
25
7. Empirical distributions
...a single configuration of the world will show statistical distributions over its
different parts. Suppose, for example, this world contains an actual ensemble
of similar experimental set-ups....it follows from the theory that the ‘typical’
world will approximately realize quantum mechanical distributions over such
approximately independent components. The role of the hypothetical ensemble
is precisely to permit definition of the word ‘typical.’ (Bell [7])
In this section we present the simplest application of (6.1), to the empirical distribution
on configurations arising from a large collection of subsystems, all of which have the “same”
wave function at a common time. This is the situation relevant to an equal-time test
of Born’s statistical law. In practice the subsystems in our collection would be widely
separated, perhaps even in different laboratories.
Consider M subsystems, with configurations x1, . . . , xM , where xi are coordinates rela-
tive to a frame of reference convenient for the i-th subsystem. Suppose that with respect
to these coordinates each subsystem has at time t the same wave function ψ, with the
composite x = (x1, . . . , xM) having the corresponding product
ψt(x) = ψ(x1) · · ·ψ(xM ) (7.1)
as its wave function at that time. Then applying the fundamental conditional probability
formula to the x-system, we obtain
P
(
Xt ∈ dx
∣∣ Yt = Y ) = |ψ(x1)|2 · · · |ψ(xM)|2 dx1 · · ·dxM , (7.2)
25It immediately follows from (6.1) that for random Ψ0 we have that
P(Xt ∈ dx|Yt,Ψ0) = |ψt(x)|
2dx,
where now P(dQ, dΨ0) = |Ψ0(Q)|
2dQµ(dΨ0) with µ any probability measure whatsoever on initial wave
functions. Moreover (6.2) remains valid.
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where Yt = Y is the configuration of the environment at this time. In other words, we
find that relative to the conditional probability distribution PYt (dQ) ≡ P(dQ|Yt = Y )
given the configuration of the environment of the composite system at time t, the (actual)
coordinates X1, . . . , XM of the subsystems at this time form a collection of independent
random variables, identically distributed, with common distribution ρqe = |ψ|
2.
In any test of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (4.1), it is the empirical distribu-
tion
ρemp(z) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
δ(z −Xi) (7.3)
of (X1, . . . , XM ) which is directly observed—so that the operational significance of the
quantum equilibrium hypothesis is that ρemp be (approximately) given by ρqe. Notice
that ρemp is a (distribution-valued) random variable on (Q,P), and that ρemp(Γ) ≡∫
Γ
ρemp(z) dz is the relative frequency in our ensemble of subsystems of the event “Xi ∈ Γ”.
It now follows from the weak law of large numbers that when the number M of sub-
systems is large, ρemp is very close to ρqe for (P
Y
t -)most initial configurations Q ∈ Q
Y
t ≡{
Q ∈ Q
∣∣ Yt = Y }, the fiber of Q for which Yt = Y : For any bounded function f(z), and
any ǫ > 0, let the “agreement set” A(M, f, ǫ, t) ⊂ QYt be the set of initial configurations
Q ∈ QYt for which
‖ρemp − ρqe‖f ≡
∣∣∣∣
∫
(ρemp(z) − ρqe(z)) f(z) dz
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
i=1
f(Xi)−
∫
f(z) |ψ(z)|
2
dz
∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫ.
(7.4)
(We suppress the dependence of A upon Y and on the subsystems under consideration.)
Then by the weak law of large numbers
PYt
(
A(M, f, ǫ, t)
)
= 1− δ(M, f, ǫ) (7.5)
where δ → 0 as M →∞.
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For a single function f , ‖ ‖f cannot provide a very good measure of closeness. Therefore,
consider any finite collection f = (fα) of bounded functions, corresponding for example to
a coarse graining of value space, and let
A(M, f , ǫ, t) ≡
⋂
α
A(M, fα, ǫ, t)
≡
{
Q ∈ QYt
∣∣∣∣ ‖ρemp − ρqe‖f ≡ sup
α
‖ρemp − ρqe‖fα ≤ ǫ
}
.
(7.6)
It follows from (7.5) that
PYt
(
A(M, f , ǫ, t)
)
= 1− δ(M, f , ǫ) (7.7)
where δ(M, f , ǫ) ≤
∑
α δ(M, fα, ǫ).
The empirical distribution ρemp does not probe in a significant way the joint distribu-
tion (7.2), i.e., the independence, of X1, . . . , XM—the law of large numbers is valid under
conditions far more general than independence. To explore independence one might em-
ploy pair functions f(Xi, Xj), or functions of several variables, in a manner analogous to
that of the preceding analysis. Rather than proceeding in this way, we merely note—more
generally—the following:
For any decision regarding the joint distribution of the Xi, we have at our disposal
only the values which happen to occur. On the basis of some feature of these values, we
must arrive at a (possibly rather tentative) conclusion. With any such feature we may
associate a subset T of the space RDM =
{
(x1, . . . , xM )
}
of possible joint values, where
D = dim(Xi) is the dimension of our subsystems.
Let T ⊂ RDM be a statistical test for the hypothesis that X1, . . . , XM are independent,
with distribution |ψ|
2
. This means that the failure to occur of the event (X1, . . . , XM) ∈ T
can be regarded as a strong indication that X1, . . . , XM are not generated by such a joint
distribution; in other words, it means that
P(T ) = 1− δ(T ) (7.8)
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with δ ≪ 1, where P(dx1, . . . , dxM ) = |ψ(x1)|
2
· · · |ψ(xM )|
2
dx1 · · ·dxM is the joint distri-
bution under examination. 1− δ(T ) is a measure of the reliability of the test T .
Let
A(T , t) =
{
Q ∈ QYt
∣∣ Xt ≡ (X1, . . . , XM) ∈ T } (7.9)
Then, trivially,
PYt
(
A(T , t)
)
= 1− δ(T ); (7.10)
i.e., the PYt -size of the set of initial configurations in Q
Y
t for which the test is passed
matches precisely the reliability of the test. (We remind the reader that the existence of
useful tests, analogous to, but more general than, the one defined for example by (7.4), is
a consequence of the weak law of large numbers.) In particular, the size of M required for
δ in (7.7) to be “sufficiently” small is precisely the size required for the corresponding test
T =
{
(x1, . . . , xM) ∈ R
DM
∣∣∣∣∣ supα
∣∣∣∣ 1M
M∑
i=1
fα(xi)−
∫
fα(z) |ψ(z)|
2
dz
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
}
(7.11)
to be “sufficiently” reliable.26
Equations (7.5), (7.7), and (7.10) are valid only for Y as described, i.e., when the x-
system has (conditional) wave function ψt ≡ ψ
Y,Ψt of the form (7.1), with which we are
primarily concerned. We remark, however, that for a general Y these equations remain
valid, provided the agreement sets which appear in them are sensibly defined in terms of
the conditional distribution PYt (dx) = |ψ
Y,Ψt(x)|2 dx of Xt given Yt = Y . For example, we
may let
A(Y, t) =
{
Q ∈ QYt
∣∣ Xt ∈ T (PYt )}, (7.12)
where, for any distribution P (on RDM ), T = T (P) is a test for P, satisfying (7.8) with
δ(T )≪ 1.
In terms of such conditioned agreement sets A(Y, t), we may define an unconditioned
agreeement set A(t) by requiring that
A(t) ∩QYt = A(Y, t); (7.13)
26See Point 12 of the Appendix.
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directly in terms of the tests T ,
A(t) =
{
Q ∈ Q
∣∣ Xt ∈ T (PYtt )}. (7.14)
Corresponding to equations (7.5), (7.7), and (7.10) we then have that
P(A(t)) = 1− δ(t) (7.15)
where
δ(t) =
∫
δ(Yt, t) dP≪ 1 (7.16)
with δ(Y, t) ≡ δ(T (PYt )).
Having said this, we wish to emphasize that equations (7.5), (7.7), and (7.10) (for a
general Y ), expressing the “largeness” of the conditioned agreement sets, are much stronger
and much more relevant than the equations (7.15), (7.16) which we have just obtained:
The original equations demand that the disagreement set B(t) = A(t)c ≡ Q \ A(t) be
“small,” not just for “most” fibers QYt corresponding to the possible environments Y at
time t, but for all such fibers. Insofar as the actual environment Yt at time t might be
rather special—for example, because it describes a world containing (human) life—the
fact that “disagreement” has “insignificant probability” for every environment, regardless
of how special, is quite important.27 Indeed, it is the crucial element in our analysis of
absolute uncertainty in Section 11.
We may summarize the conclusion at which we have so far arrived with the assertion
that for Bohmian mechanics typical initial configurations lead to empirical statistics at
time t which are governed by the quantum formalism (see the last paragraph of Section 3).
Typicality is to be here understood in the sense of quantum equilibrium: something is
true for typical initial configurations if the set of initial configurations for which it is
false is small in the sense provided by the quantum equilibrium distribution P (and the
appropriate conditional quantum equilibrium distributions PYt arising from P).
27Note, in particular, that for any condition C on environments implying, among other things, that the
wave function of the x-system at time t is of the form (7.1), we have the same statement of the “smallness”
of the disagreement set with respect to the conditional distribution given Yt ∈ C.
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We wish to emphasize the role of equivariance in our analysis. Notice that equa-
tions (7.6), (7.7) would remain valid—with δ small—if, for example, ρqe were replaced
by |ψ|
4
, provided the sense P of typicality were given, not by |Ψ|
4
(which is not equivari-
ant), but by the density to which |Ψt|
4
would (backwards) evolve as the time decreases from
t to THE INITIAL TIME 0. This distribution, this sense of typicality, would presumably
be extravagantly complicated and exceedingly artificial.
More important, it would depend upon the time t under consideration, while equiv-
ariance provides a notion of typicality that works for all t. In fact, because of this time
independence of typicality for quantum equilibrium, we immediately obtain the typicality
of joint agreement for a not-too-large collection of times t1, . . . , tJ
P

⋃
j
B(tj)

≪ 1, (7.17)
as well as the typicality of joint agreement at most times of a collection of any size. We
shall not go into this in more detail here because equivariance in fact yields results far more
powerful than these, covering the empirical distribution for configurations X1, . . . , XM re-
ferring to times t1, . . . , tM which may all be different, to which we now turn. We shall find
that in exploring this general situation, further novelties of the quantum domain emerge.
8. Multitime experiments: the problem28
In the previous section we analyzed the joint distribution of the simultaneous configu-
rations X1, . . . , XM of M (distinct and disjoint) subsystems, each of which has the same
wave function ψ. We would now like to consider the more general, and more realistic, sit-
uation in which X1, . . . , XM refer to any M subsystems, some or all of which might in fact
be the same, at respective times t1, . . . , tM , which might all be different. And we would
again like to conclude that suitably conditioned, X1, . . . , XM are independent, each with
28Sections 8–10 should perhaps be skipped at first reading.
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distribution given by |ψ|
2
; this would imply, precisely as in Section 7, the corresponding
results about empirical distributions and tests.
We shall find, however, that this multitime situation requires considerably more care
than we have so far needed; in particular, what we might think at first glance we would
like to be true, in fact turns out to be in general false!
To begin to appreciate the difficulty, consider configurations X1 and X2 referring to the
same system but at different times t1 < t2, and suppose this system has wave function
ψ at both of these times. Can we conclude that X1 and X2 are independent? Of course
not! For example, if the system is suitably isolated between the times t1 and t2, so that
its configuration undergoes an autonomous evolution, then X2 will in fact be a function of
X1; in the simplest case, when the wave function ψ is a ground state, we will in fact have
that X2 = X1.
What has just been described is not, however, an instance of disagreement with the
quantum formalism, which concerns only the results of observation—and in the previous
example observation would destroy the isolation upon which the strong correlation between
X1 and X2 was based. Moreover, the particular difficulty just described is easily remedied
by taking “observation” into account. However, it is perhaps worth noting that for the
equal-time analysis it was not necessary in any way to take observation directly into account
to obtain agreement with the quantum formalism—X1, . . . , XM had the distribution given
by the quantum formalism regardless of whether these variables were observed.
A much more serious, and subtle, difficulty arises from the fact that the wave function
ψt of a system at time t is itself a random variable (see (5.21)), while we wish to consider
situations in which our systems each have the same (non-random) wave function ψ. In the
equal-time case this consideration led to no difficulty—and was barely noticed—since ψt
is nonrandom relative to the environment Yt upon which we there conditioned. For the
multitime case, however, it is at first glance by no means clear how we should capture the
stipulation that our systems each have wave function ψ.
One possibility would be to treat this stipulation as further conditioning, i.e., to con-
sider the conditional distribution of X1, . . . , XM given, among other things, that the wave
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functions ψti of our respective systems at the respective times t1, . . . , tM satisfy ψti = ψ for
all i. This would be a bad idea! The conditioning just described can affect the distribution
of the configurations X1, . . . , XM in surprising, and uncontrollable, ways.
For example, suppose that when the result of an observation of X1 is “favorable,” the
happy experimenter proceeds somehow to prepare the second system in state ψ at time t2,
while if the result is “unfavorable,” the depressed experimenter requires some extra time
to recuperate, and prepares the second system in state ψ at time t′2 > t2. In this situation
X1 need not be independent of ψt2 , so that conditioning on ψt2 may bias the distribution
of X1.
Moreover, we believe that this example is not nearly so artificial as it may at first
appear. In the real world, of which the experimenters and their equipment are a part,
which experiments get performed where and when can, and typically will, be correlated
with the results of previous experiments, with each other, and with any number of other
factors, such as, for example, the weather, which we would not normally take into account.
Therefore, stochastic conditioning can be a very tricky business here, yielding conditional
distributions of a surprising, and thoroughly unwanted, character.
What has just been said suggests that our multitime formulation is, while nonetheless
inadequate, also perhaps not as general as we might want. The times at which our exper-
iments are performed, and indeed the subsystems upon which they are performed, may
themselves be random, and a more general formulation, like the one we shall give, should
take this into account. However, we wish to emphasize that, as we shall see, the primary
value of such a “random system” formulation is not increased generality. Rather, it is
first of all simply the case that, strictly speaking, the systems upon which experiments get
performed are, in fact, themselves random—not just the results, or the state of the system,
but the time of the experiment as well as the specific system, the particular collection of
particles, upon which we focus and act. Furthermore, when we properly take this into
account, the difficulty we have been discussing vanishes!
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9. Random systems
Consider a pair σ = (π, T ), where T ∈ R (with T ≥ 0 if THE INITIAL TIME is 0) and
π is a splitting
q = (x, y) ≡ (πq, π⊥q) (9.1)
(see Section 5); we identify π with the projection Q ≡ R3N → R3m onto the configuration
of the (m-particle) x-system, with the components of x ≡ πq ordered, say, as in q. π comes
together with π⊥, the complementary projection, onto the coordinates of the environment
(also ordered as in q). Thus we may identify π with the subset of {1, . . . , N} corresponding
to the particles of the x-system. σ specifies a subsystem at a given time, for example, the
system upon which we experiment and the time at which the experiment begins.29
Now allow both T and π to be random, i.e., allow T to be a real-valued, and π to be
a projection-valued, function on the space Q of initial configurations. (π may thus be
identified with a random subset of {1, . . . , N}.) For σ = (π, T ) we write
Xσ = πQT (9.2)
for the configuration of the system and
Yσ = π
⊥QT (9.3)
for the configuration of its environment.30
We say that a pair
σ = (π, T ), (9.5)
consisting of a random projection and a random time as described, is a random system
provided
{σ = σ0} ∈ F(Yσ0) (9.6)
29If indistinguishability were taken into account, our identification of π would have to be modified
accordingly. We might then associate it, for example, with a subset of R3. (See footnote 15.)
30More explicitly, when π and T are random, Xσ is the random variable
Xσ(Q) = π(Q)
(
QT (Q)
)
(9.4)
and similarly for Yσ .
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for any (nonrandom) σ0 = (π0, t).
31 Here we use the notation A ∈ F(W1,W2, . . . ) to
convey that IA, the indicator function of the event A ⊂ Q, is a function of W1,W2, . . . .
32
We emphasize that for a random system σ, the configuration Xσ (Yσ) of the system (of
its environment) is doubly random—σ is itself random, and for a given value σ0 of σ, Xσ0
(Yσ0) is, of course, still random.
The condition (9.6) says that the value of a random system, i.e., the identity of the
particular subsystem and time that it happens to specify, is reflected in its environment.
In practice, this value is expressed by the state of the experimenters, their devices and
records, and whatever other features of the environment form the basis of its selection. It
is for this reason that we usually fail to notice that our systems are random: relative to
“ourselves,” which we naturally don’t think of as random, they are completely determined.
Notice also that (9.6) fits nicely with the notion of the wave function of a subsystem, as
expressed, e.g., by (5.19).33
We shall write ψσ for the (effective or conditional) wave function of the random system
σ—given Q ∈ Q, the wave function at time T (Q) of the system defined by π(Q). Using
31The condition (9.6), which is formally what we need, technically suffers from “measure-0 defects”—
since a random time T will typically be a continuous random variable, the event {σ = σ0} will typically
have measure 0, while conditional probabilities, for which (9.6) is formally utilized, are strictly defined
only up to sets of measure 0. This defect can be eliminated by replacing (9.6) by the condition that for
any t there exist a number ǫ0(t) > 0 such that
{π = π0, t− ǫ ≤ T ≤ t} ∈ F(Y(pi0,t))
for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ0(t), using which our formal analysis becomes rigorous via standard continuity-density
arguments. (Of course, if time were discrete no such technicalities would arise.)
32More precisely, F(W1,W2, . . . ) denotes the sigma-algebra generated by the random variablesW1,W2, . . . .
33While the preceding informal description may not appear to discriminate between (9.6) and the
perhaps equally natural condition
σ ∈ F(Yσ),
which we may formally write as
{σ = σ0} ∈ F(Yσ), (9.7)
a careful reading should convey (9.6). The conditions (9.6) and (9.7) are not, in fact, equivalent, nor
even comparable. In practice both are satisfied, the validity of (9.7) deriving mainly from the existence of
“clocks.” We have defined the notion of random system using only (9.6) because this is what turns out to
be relevant for our analysis. (Note also that, trivially, σ ∈ F(Yσ , σ).)
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the notation of equation (5.21), we have that
ψσ = ψ
Yσ
T,pi, (9.8)
where the subscript π makes explicit the dependence of ψYt upon the splitting q = (x, y).
Note that ψσ is a functional of both σ and Yσ.
The crucial ingredient in our multitime analysis is the observation that the fundamental
conditional probability formula (6.1) remains valid for random systems: For any random
system σ34
P(Xσ ∈ dx|Yσ, σ) = |ψσ(x)|
2dx, (9.9)
which can in a sense be regarded as the most compact expression of the entire quantum
formalism. To see this note that for any value σ0 = (π0, t) of σ, we have that on {σ = σ0}
P(Xσ ∈ dx|Yσ, σ) = P(Xσ ∈ dx|Yσ, σ = σ0)
= P(Xσ0 ∈ dx|Yσ0 , σ = σ0)
= P(Xσ0 ∈ dx|Yσ0) ≡ P(Xt ∈ dx|Yt)
= |ψt(x)|
2dx ≡ |ψσ0(x)|
2dx
= |ψσ(x)|
2dx,
(9.10)
where we have used (6.1) and (9.6), as well as the obvious fact that Xσ, Yσ, and ψσ agree
respectively with Xσ0(≡ Xt), Yσ0(≡ Yt), and ψσ0(≡ ψt) on {σ = σ0}.
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10. Multitime distributions
...every atomic phenomenon is closed in the sense that its observation is based
on registrations obtained by means of suitable amplification devices with ir-
reversible functioning such as, for example, permanent marks on the photo-
graphic plate...the quantum-mechanical formalism permits well-defined appli-
cations only to such closed phenomena... (Bohr, ref. 22, pp. 73 and 90)
34The conditioning here on σ can of course be removed if σ ∈ F(Yσ) or, more generally, if ψσ ∈ F(Yσ),
e.g., if ψσ = ψ is constant, i.e., nonrandom.
35The reader familiar with stochastic processes should note the similarity between (9.6) and (9.9) on the
one hand, and the notions of stopping time and the strong Markov property from Markov process theory.
Indeed, (6.1) can be regarded as a kind of Markov property, in relation to which (9.9) then becomes a
strong Markov property.
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Now consider a sequence σi = (πi, Ti), i = 1, . . . ,M , of random systems, ordered so
that (with probability 1)
T1 ≤ T2 ≤ · · · ≤ TM . (10.1)
We write Xi for Xσi , Yi for Yσi , and let
Fi = F(Yσi , σi). (10.2)
Suppose that for the wave function of the i-th system we have
ψσi = ψi (10.3)
where ψi is nonrandom, i.e., (with probability 1) the random wave function ψσi is the
specific wave function ψi. This will be the case if the requirement that the i-th system
have wave function ψi forms part of the basis of selection for this system, i.e., for σi—
for example, if the i-th experiment, by prior decision, must be preceded by a successful
preparation of the state ψi.
Finally, suppose that
Xi ∈ Fj for all i < j, (10.4)
i.e., for all i < j Xi is a function of Yj and σj . This will hold, for example, if, with
probability 1, each Xi is measured—if the i-th measurement has not been completed, and
the result “recorded,” prior to time Tj , then the i-th system, together with the apparatus
which measures it, must still be isolated at time Tj , from σj as well as from the rest of its
environment, remaining so until the completion of this measurement.
Notice that since ψj is nonrandom, it follows from (10.4) and the fundamental condi-
tional probability formula (9.9) that
P(Xj ∈ dxj|X1, . . . , Xj−1) = P(Xj ∈ dxj |Yj, σj)
= |ψj(xj)|
2dxj .
(10.5)
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Thus
P (Xi ∈ dxi, i ≤ j) = P (Xi ∈ dxi, i ≤ j − 1)P (Xj ∈ dxj |X1 = x1, . . . , Xj−1 = xj−1)
= P (Xi ∈ dxi, i ≤ j − 1) |ψj(xj)|
2dxj
= |ψ1(x1)|
2 · · · |ψj(xj)|
2dx1 · · ·dxj ,
(10.6)
and
X1, . . . , XM are independent, with each Xi having distribution given by |ψi|
2
. (10.7)
As it stands (10.7) is mildly useless, since the probability distribution P with respect to
which it is formulated does not take into account any “prior” information, some of which we
might imagine to be relevant to the outcomes of our sequence of experiments. Therefore, it
is significant that our entire random system analysis (including (10.1), (10.3), and (10.4))
can be relativized to any set M ⊂ Q—i.e., we may replace (Q,P) by (M,PM) where
PM(dQ) = P(dQ|M)—without essential modification, provided the random systems σ
under consideration satisfy
M∈ F(Yσ, σ). (10.8)
In particular, (10.7) is valid even with respect to PM provided that for all i
M∈ Fi. (10.9)
We might think ofM as reflecting the “macroscopic state” at a time prior to all of our
experiments, though one might argue about whether (10.9) would then be satisfied. Be
that as it may, any event M describing any sort of prior information to which we could
conceivably have access would be expected to satisfy (10.9), particularly if this information
were recorded.
Now suppose that ψi = ψ for all i. Then the joint distribution of X1, . . . , XM with
respect to PM is precisely the same as in the equal time situation of Section 7.36 Since
36Notice that equal-time experiments are covered by our multitime analysis—all the Ti can be identical—
and in this case (10.4) is automatically satisfied. However, for our earlier equal-time results it was necessary
that ψ be the effective wave function, while here conditional is sufficient.
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the analysis there depended only upon this joint distribution, we may draw the same
conclusions concerning empirical distributions and tests as before. We thus find for our
sequence of experiments that typical initial configurations—typical with respect to P or
PM—yield empirical statistics governed by the quantum formalism.
Perhaps this claimed agreement with the quantum formalism requires elaboration. We
have been explicitly concerned here only with the statistics governing the outcomes of
position measurements. Now we were also concerned only with configurations in our equal-
time analysis of Section 7. But our results there directly implied agreement with the
quantum formalism for the results of measurements of any observable:
Our statistical conclusions there were valid regardless of whether or not the configura-
tions—the Xi—were “measured.” Thus, for the equal time case the joint distribution of
any functions Zi = fi(Xi) of the configurations must be inherited from the distribution of
the Xi themselves. In particular, by considering subsystems of the form (5.4), where the
apparatus “measures the observable”—i.e., self-adjoint operator—Zˆi, with wave functions
ψˆi = ψi ⊗ φi where φi is the initial(ized) wave function of the i-th apparatus, letting Zi
be the outcome of this “measurement of Zˆi” and using what we know about the joint
distribution of the Xi, it follows that the Zi are independent, and, as in the last paragraph
of Section 3, that each Zi must have the distribution provided by the quantum formalism,
namely, that given by the spectral measure ρψi
Zˆi
(dz) for Zˆi in the state ψi. (For a detailed
account of how this comes about see [14,18,29].)
The corresponding result for the multitime case does not, in fact, follow from (10.7).
The latter does require that the configurations be “measured,” and a “measurement of Zˆi”
need not involve, and indeed may be incompatible with, a “measurement” of Xi.
But, while it does not follow from the result for the Xi, the corresponding result for
“general measurements” does, in fact, follow from the analysis for the Xi. We need merely
suppose for the Zi what we did for the Xi, namely, that
Zi ∈ Fj for all i < j, (10.10)
to conclude, for the sequence of outcomes Zi of “measurements of observables” Zˆi in states
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ψi, that (with respect to P
M for M satisfying (10.8))
Z1, . . . , ZM are independent, with each Zi having distribution given by ρ
ψi
Zˆi
, (10.11)
from which the usual conclusions concerning empirical distributions and tests follow im-
mediately.37
We emphasize that the assumptions (10.4), (10.10), and (10.9) are minimal. They
demand merely that facts about results and initial experimental conditions not be “forgot-
ten.” Thus they are hardly assumptions at all, but almost the very conditions essential to
enable us, at the conclusion of our sequence of experiments, to talk in an informed manner
about the experimental conditions and results and compare these with theory.
Moreover, it is not hard to see that if these conditions are relaxed, the “predictions”
should not be expected to agree with those of the quantum formalism.38 This is a striking
illustration of the way in which Bohmian mechanics does not merely agree with the quan-
tum formalism, but, eliminating ambiguities, illuminates, clarifies, and sharpens it.39
11. Absolute uncertainty
That the quantum equilibrium hypothesis ρ = |ψ|
2
conveys the most detailed knowledge
possible concerning the present configuration of a subsystem (of which the “observer” or
37That Zi = fi(Xi) will in fact be the outcome of what would normally be considered a measurement
of Zˆi can be expected only if ψi is the effective wave function of the i-th system, and not merely the
conditional wave function: The functional form of Zi is based upon the evolution of a system initially
with effective wave function ψi interacting with a suitable apparatus but otherwise isolated. However, the
conclusion (10.11) for Zi = fi(Xi) is valid even for ψi merely the conditional wave function, though in
this case Zi may have little connection with what is actually observed.
38Note that by selectively “forgetting” results we can dramatically alter the statistics of those that we
have not “forgotten.”
39The analysis we have presented does not allow for the possibility that with nonvanishing probability
Ti = ∞, i.e., the conditions for the selection of σi are never satisfied. Our results extend to this case
provided that (X1, . . . , Xi) and {Ti+1 < ∞} are conditionally independent given {Ti < ∞} for all i =
1, . . . ,M − 1, in which case our results are valid given {TM <∞}. Note that without the aforementioned
conditional independence our results would not be expected to hold: Suppose, for example, that if the
initial results are “unfavorable,” the depressed experimenter destroys humankind, and systems no longer
get prepared properly. Thus, conditioning on {TM <∞} yields a “biased” sample. The preceding points to
perhaps a different, albeit rather minor, ambiguity in the quantum formalism, of which Bohmian mechanics
again forces one to take note, and in so doing to rectify.
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“knower” is not a part—see Point 23 of the Appendix), what we have called absolute
uncertainty, is implicit in the results of Sections 7 and 10.40 The key observation relevant
to this conclusion is this: Whatever we may reasonably mean by knowledge, information, or
certainty—and what precisely these do mean is not at all an easy question—it simply must
be the case that the experimenters, their measuring devices, their records, and whatever
other factors may form the basis for, or representation of, what could conceivably be
regarded as knowledge of, or information concerning, the systems under investigation,
must be a part of or grounded in the environment of these systems.
The possession by experimenters of such information must thus be reflected in correla-
tions between the system properties to which this information refers and the features of
the environment which express or represent this information. We have shown, however,
that given its wave function there can be no correlation between (the configuration of) a
system and (that of) its environment, even if the full microscopic environment Y—itself
grossly more than what we could conceivably have access to—is taken into account.
Because we consider absolute uncertainty to be a very important conclusion, with signif-
icance extending beyond the conceptual foundations of quantum theory, we shall elaborate
on how our results, for both the equal-time and the general multitime cases, entail this
conclusion. The crucial point is that the possession of knowledge or information implies
the existence of certain features of the environment, an environmentally based selection
criterion, such that systems selected on the basis of this criterion satisfy the conditions
expressed by this information. (For example, when a measuring device registers, or the
associated computer printout records, that “|X | < 1”, it should in fact be more or less the
case that |X | < 1.)
40Note, however, that as far as knowledge of the past is concerned, it is possible to do a good deal better
than what would be permitted by absolute uncertainty for knowledge of the present: Having prepared our
subsystem in a specific (not-too-localized) quantum state, with known wave function ψ, we may proceed to
measure the configuration X of this system, thereby obtaining detailed knowledge of both its wave function
and its configuration for some past time. But note well that the determination of the configuration may—
indeed, as we show, must—lead to an appropriate “collapse” of ψ, and hence our knowledge of the (present)
configuration will be compatible with ρ = |ψ|2 for the present wave function. (Note also that for quantum
orthodoxy as well it is sometimes argued that knowledge of the past need not be constrained by the
uncertainty principle.)
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Suppose that ourM systems of Section 7 have been chosen on the basis of some features
of the environment, say by selection from an ensemble ofM ′ systems, also of the form con-
sidered there. The selection criterion can be based upon any property of the environment
Yt = Y of the original (preselection) ensemble. (We allow for a rather arbitrary selection
criterion, though in practice selection would of course be quite constrained. In particular,
a realistic selection criterion should, perhaps, be the “same” for each system; i.e., whether
or not the i-th system is selected should depend, for all i, upon the same property of Y
relative to this system. However, we need here no such constraints.)
Since, with respect toPYt , the configurations of the systems of our original ensemble were
independent, with each having distribution given by |ψ|
2
, and since our selection criterion
is based solely upon the environment Y of the original ensemble and in no way directly on
the values of the configurations themselves, it follows that the configurations X1, . . . , XM
of our selected subsystems have precisely the same distribution (also relative to PYt ) as
the original ensemble. Thus, for typical initial universal configurations, the empirical
distribution of configurations across our selected ensemble will be given (approximately)
by |ψ|
2
, just as for the original ensemble. It follows that, whatever else it may be, our
selection criterion cannot be based upon what we could plausibly regard as information
concerning system configurations (more detailed than what is already expressed by |ψ|
2
).
For the general case, of multitime experiments as described in Section 10, the analysis is
perhaps even simpler. In fact, for this case there is really nothing to do, beyond observing
that any (environmentally based) selection criterion, whatever it may be, can be incorpo-
rated into the definition of our random systems, as part of the basis for their selection.
It thus follows from the results of Section 10 that no such criterion can be regarded as
reflecting any information, beyond |ψ|
2
, about the configurations of these systems. There-
fore, no devices whatsoever, based on any present or future technology, will provide us
with the corresponding knowledge. In a Bohmian universe such knowledge is absolutely
unattainable!41
41The reader concerned that we have overlooked the possibility that information may sometimes be
grounded in non-configurational features of the environment, for example in velocity patterns, should
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We emphasize that we do not claim that knowledge of the detailed configuration of a
system is impossible, a claim that would be manifestly false. We maintain only that—as a
consequence of the fact that the configuration X of a system and the configuration Y of its
environment are conditionally independent given its wave function ψ—all such knowledge
must be mediated by ψ. And we emphasize that a major reason for the not insignificant
length of our argument, as presented in Sections 6-11, was the necessity to extract from
the aforementioned conditional independence analogous conclusions concerning empirical
correlations.
From our conclusion that when a system has wave function ψ we cannot know more
about its configuration X than what is expressed by |ψ|
2
, it follows trivially that knowledge
that its wave function is ψ similarly constrains our knowledge of the configuration. It also
trivially follows that detailed knowledge of X , for example that X ∈ I for a given set of
values I, entails detailed conclusions concerning the wave function, for example that the
(conditional) wave function of the system is supported by I.42
Finally, in order to further sharpen the character of our absolute uncertainty, one more
point must be made. We have focused here primarily on the statistical aspect of the wave
function of a system. But any “absolute uncertainty” based solely upon the fact that
knowledge of the configuration X of a system must be mediated by (knowledge of) some
“object,” in the sense that the distribution of X can be expressed simply in terms of that
consider the following (recall as well footnote 12):
(1) Knowledge and information are, in fact, almost always, if not always, configurationally grounded.
Examples are hardly necessary here, but we mention one—synaptic connections in the brain.
(2) Dynamically relevant differences between environments, e.g., velocity differences, which are not
instantaneously correlated with configurational differences quickly generate them anyway. And
we need not be concerned with differences which are not dynamically relevant!
(3) Knowledge and information must be communicable if they are to be of any social relevance; their
content must be stable under communication. But communication typically produces configura-
tional representations, e.g., pressure patterns in sound waves.
(4) In any case, in view of the effective product form (5.17), when a system has an effective wave
function, the configuration Y provides an exhaustive description of the state of its environment
(aside from the universal wave function Ψ—and through it Φ—which for convenience of exposition
we are regarding as given—see also footnotes 27 and 31).
42And even if the system does not have an effective wave function, we have that any density matrix
describing the system must also be “supported” by I.
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“object,” may be sorely lacking in substance if the “object” is merely statistical. In such
a case, knowledge of the “object” need amount to nothing more than knowledge that X
has the distribution so expressed.
What lends substance to the “absolute uncertainty” in Bohmian mechanics—and jus-
tifies our use of that phrase—is the fact that the relevant “object,” the wave function ψ,
plays a dual role: it has, in addition to its statistical aspect, also a dynamical one, as
expressed, e.g., in equations (5.8) and (5.11). Thus, knowledge of the wave function of a
system, which sharply constrains our knowledge of its configuration, is knowledge of some-
thing in its own right, something “real,” and not merely knowledge that the configuration
has distribution |ψ|
2
.
Moreover, the detailed character of this dynamical aspect is such that a wave function
with narrow support quickly spreads, owing to the dispersion in Schro¨dinger’s equation, to
one with broad support, a change which generates a similar change in the distribution of
the configuration. It follows that the unavoidable price we must pay for sharp knowledge of
the present configuration of a system is at best hazy knowledge of its future configuration,
i.e., of its “effective velocity.” In particular, our absolute uncertainty embodies absolute
unpredictability. More generally, the usual uncertainty relations for noncommuting “ob-
servables” become a corollary of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis ρ = |ψ|
2
as soon as
the dynamical role of the wave function is taken into account; a detailed analysis can be
found in [14,18,29].
12. Knowledge and nonequilibrium
The alert reader may be troubled that we have established results about randomness
and uncertainty, results of a flavor often associated with “chaos” and “strong ergodic
properties,” without having to invoke any of the hard estimates and delicate analysis
usually required to establish such properties. Indeed, our analysis neither used nor referred
to any such properties. How can this be?
The short answer is quantum equilibrium, with all that the notion of equilibrium entails
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and conveys, an answer upon which we shall elaborate in the next section. Here we would
like merely to observe that what is truly remarkable is not absolute uncertainty, irreducible
limitations on what we can know, but rather that it is possible to know anything at all!
We take (the possibility of) knowledge, our information gathering and storing abilities,
too much for granted. (And we conclude all too readily that the unknowable is unreal.)
Of course, it is not at all surprising that we should do so, in view of the essential role such
abilities play in our existence and survival. But that there should arise stable systems
embodying (what can reasonably be regarded as) such abilities is a perhaps astonishing
fact about the way our universe works, about the laws of nature!
The point is that we, the knowers, are separate and distinct from the things about which
we know, and know in marvelous detail. How can there be, between completely disjoint
entities, sufficiently strong correlations to allow for a representation in one of these entities
of detailed features of the other? Indeed, such correlations are absent in thermodynamic
equilibrium. With respect to (any of the distributions describing) global thermodynamic
equilibrium, disjoint systems are more or less independent, and systems are more or less
independent of their environments, facts incompatible with the existence of knowledge or
information.
What renders knowledge at all possible is nonequilibrium. In fact, rather trivially, the
very existence of the devices and records, not to mention brains, yielding or embodying any
sort of information is impossible under global equilibrium. And, according to Heisenberg,
“every act of observation is by its very nature an irreversible process” [37], and thus
fundamentally nonequilibrium.
Thus, the very notion of quantum equilibrium, of equilibrium of configurations relative
to the wave function, already suggests the unknowability of these configurations beyond
the wave function. Our results merely provide a firm foundation for this suggestion. What
is, however, striking is the simplicity of the analysis and how absolute and clean are the
conclusions.
Insofar as equilibrium is associated with the impossibility of knowledge, equilibrium
alone does not provide an adequate perspective on our analysis. In particular, our results
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say perhaps little of physical relevance unless some knowledge is possible, e.g., of the wave
function of a particular system, or of the results of observations. But for this nonequilib-
rium is essential.
13. Quantum equilibrium and thermodynamic (non)equilibrium
[In] a complete physical description, the statistical quantum theory would...take
an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the
framework of classical mechanics. (Einstein, in ref. 50, p.672)
We would like now to place quantum equilibrium within a broader context by comparing
it with classical thermodynamic equilibrium.
According to the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, when a system has wave function ψ,
the distribution ρ of its configuration is given by
ρ = |ψ|
2
. (13.1)
Similarly, the Gibbs postulate of statistical mechanics asserts that for a system at temper-
ature T , the distribution ρ of its phase space point is given by
ρ =
e−H/kT
Z
, (13.2)
where H is the classical Hamiltonian of the system (including, say, the “wall potential”),
k is Boltzmann’s constant, and Z, the partition function, is a normalization.
In addition, we found that (13.1) assumed sharp mathematical form when understood
as expressing the conditional probability formula (6.1). (13.2) is perhaps also best regarded
as a conditional probability formula, for the distribution of the phase point of the system
given that of its environment—after all, the Hamiltonian H typically involves interactions
with the environment, and the temperature T (like the wave function) can be regarded as
a function of (the state of)the environment. (How otherwise would we know the temper-
ature?) Furthermore, for a rigorous analysis of equilibrium distributions in the thermo-
dynamic limit—i.e., of (the idealization given by) global thermodynamic equilibrium—the
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equations of Dobrushin and Lanford-Ruelle [27,41], stipulating that (13.2)—regarded as
expressing such a conditional distribution—be satisfied for all subsystems, often play a
defining role.43
Moreover, what we have just described is only a part of a deeper and broader analogy,
between the scheme
classical mechanics =⇒ equilibrium statistical mechanics =⇒ thermodynamics, (13.3)
which outlines the (classical) connection between the microscopic level of description and
a phenomenological formalism on the macroscopic level; and the scheme
Bohmian mechanics =⇒
quantum equilibrium:
statistical mechanics rel-
ative to the wave function
=⇒ the quantum formalism, (13.4)
which outlines the (quantum) connection between the microscopic level and another phe-
nomenological formalism—the quantum measurement formalism. We began this section
by comparing only the middle components of (13.3) and (13.4), but it is in fact the full
schemes which are roughly analogous.
In particular, note that the middle of both schemes concerns the equilibrium distribution
for the complete state description of the structure on the left with respect to the state for
the structure on the right—the macrostate, as described by temperature (or energy) and,
say, volume; or the quantum state, specified by the wave function. However, the quantum
formalism does not live entirely on the macroscopic level, since the wave function for, say,
an atom is best regarded as inhabiting (mainly) the microscopic level, at least for Bohmian
mechanics.
The second arrow of (13.3) is, of course, associated primarily with the work of J. Willard
Gibbs [34]; the corresponding arrow of (13.4), upon which we have not focused here,
43However, for a universe which, like ours, is not in global thermodynamic equilibrium, there is pre-
sumably no probability distribution on initial phase points with respect to which the probabilities (13.2),
for all subsystems which happen to be “in thermodynamic equilibrium” and all times, are the conditional
probabilities given the environments of the subsystems. In other words, roughly speaking, (13.2) is not
equivariant. (See Krylov [39], as well as the discussion after (13.4).)
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will be the subject of [29]. (See also [14,18].) We have here focused on the first arrow
of (13.4), i.e., on deriving the quantum equilibrium hypothesis from Bohmian mechanics.
The corresponding arrow of (13.3) remains an active area of research, though it does
not appear likely that a comprehensive rigorous analysis will be forthcoming any time
soon. Conventional wisdom to the contrary notwithstanding, the problem of the rigorous
justification, from first principles, of the use of the “standard ensembles,” i.e., of the
derivation of randomness governed by detailed probabilities, is far more difficult for classical
thermodynamic equilibrium than for quantum theory!
How can this be? How is it possible so easily to derive the quantum equilibrium hypoth-
esis from first principles (i.e., from Bohmian mechanics), while the corresponding result for
thermodynamics—the rigorous derivation of the Gibbs postulate from first principles—is
so very difficult? The answer, we believe, is that “pure equilibrium” is easy, while nonequi-
librium, even a little bit, is hard. In our nonequilibrium universe, systems which happen
to be in thermodynamic equilibrium are surrounded by, and arose from, (thermodynamic)
nonequilibrium. Thus with thermodynamic equilibrium we are dealing with islands of
equilibrium in a sea of nonequilibrium. But with quantum equilibrium we are in effect
dealing with a global equilibrium, albeit relative to the wave function.
What makes nonequilibrium so very difficult is the fact that for nontrivial dynamics it is
extremely hard to get a handle on the evolution of nonequilibrium ensembles adequate to
permit us rigorously to conclude much of anything concerning the present distribution that
would arise from a given nonequilibrium distribution in the (distant) past. To establish
“convergence to equilibrium” for times t → ∞ (mixing) is itself extremely difficult, but
even this would be of little physical relevance, since we generally deal with, and can survive
only during, times much earlier than the epoch of global thermodynamic equilibrium.
We should perhaps elaborate on why global equilibrium is so easy. A key aspect of
equilibrium is, of course, stationarity—or equivariance. But how can this be sufficient
for our purposes? Mere stationarity is not normally sufficient in a dynamical system
analysis to conclude that typical behavior embodies randomness governed by the stationary
distribution. Such “almost everywhere”-type assertions usually require the ergodicity of
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the dynamics. Why did we not find it necessary to establish some sort of ergodicity?
The answer, we believe, lies in another critical aspect of the notion of equilibrium, shared
by the schemes (13.3) and (13.4), and arising from the fact that both schemes are concerned
with large “systems,” with the thermodynamic limit as it were. In equilibrium, whether
quantum or thermodynamic, most configurations or phase points are “macroscopically
similar”: quantities given by suitable spatial averages—e.g., density, energy density, or
velocity fluctuations for thermodynamic equilibrium, and empirical correlations for quan-
tum equilibrium—are more or less constant over the state space, in a sense defined by
the equilibrium distribution. To say that a system is in equilibrium is then to say that its
configuration or phase point is typical, in the sense that the values of these spatial averages
are typical.
Now while the individual subsystems with which we have been concerned may be micro-
scopic, our analysis, in fact, is effectively a “large system analysis.” This is manifest in the
equal-time analysis of Section 7, and for the general, multitime analysis it is implicit in our
measurability conditions (10.4) and (10.8), which are plausible only for a universe having
a large number of degrees of freedom. Thus, just as for a system already in thermodynamic
equilibrium, we have no need for the ergodicity of the dynamics—just “stationarity”—since
the kind of behavior we wish to establish occurs for a huge set of initial configurations, the
“overwhelming majority.”
(It might also be argued that we have, in fact, established for Bohmian mechanics a kind
of effective Bernoulliness, and hence an effective ergodicity. And, again, the fact that we
can do this with little work comes from the “thermodynamic limit” aspect of our analysis.)
The reader should compare the impossibility of perpetual motion machines, which is
associated with the scheme (13.3), with that of “knowledge machines,” as expressed by
absolute uncertainty, associated with the scheme (13.4). In both cases the existence of
devices of a certain character is precluded by general theoretical considerations—more or
less equilibrium considerations for both—rather than by a detailed analysis of the workings
of the various possible devices.
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14. Global equilibrium beneath nonequilibrium
But to admit things not visible to the gross creatures that we are is, in my
opinion, to show a decent humility, and not just a lamentable addiction to
metaphysics. (Bell [9])
The schemes (13.3) and (13.4) refer to different universes, a classical universe and a
quantum (Bohmian) universe. Since our universe happens to be a quantum one, it would,
perhaps, be better to consider, instead of (13.3), the analogous quantum scheme44
Bohmian mechanics =⇒ quantum statistical mechanics =⇒ thermodynamics. (14.1)
While the second arrow of (14.1) is standard, and presumably nonproblematical, research
on the first arrow has not yet reached its infancy.
Note that it would make little sense to ask for a derivation of quantum statistical me-
chanics from the first principles provided by orthodox quantum theory. The very meaning
of orthodox quantum theory is so entwined with processes, such as measurements, in which
thermodynamic considerations play a crucial role that it is difficult to imagine where such
a derivation might begin, or, for that matter, what such a derivation could possibly mean!
(And insofar as Bohmian mechanics clarifies the meaning and significance of the wave
function of a system, and permits a coherent analysis of the microscopic and macroscopic
domains within a common theoretical framework, it may well be that the last word has
not yet been written concerning the connection represented by the second arrow.)
If nonequilibrium is an essential aspect of our universe, and if configurations are in
quantum equilibrium, i.e., pure equilibrium relative to the wave function, what then is the
source, in our universe, of nonequilibrium? What is it that is not in equilibrium? The wave
function, of course—both the universal wave function Ψ and, as a consequence, subsystem
44While it can be shown that in the “macroscopic limit”
Bohmian mechanics =⇒ classical mechanics,
a proper understanding of thermodynamics must be in terms of the actual behavior of the constituents of
equilibrium systems, i.e., quantum behavior.
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wave functions ψ. At the same time, the middle of the scheme (14.1) can be regarded as
concerned with the distribution of the subsystem wave function ψ for subsystems which
happen to be in thermodynamic equilibrium. But by exploiting global thermodynamic
nonequilibrium we are able to see beneath the thermodynamic-macroscopic level of de-
scription, while with global quantum equilibrium there is no quantum nonequilibrium to
reveal the system configuration X beneath the system wave function ψ.
It is important, however, not to succumb to the temptation to conclude, as does Heisen-
berg [37], that configurations therefore provide merely an “ideological superstructure” best
left out of quantum theory; for, as we have seen, the very meaning of the wave function ψ
of a subsystem requires the existence of configurations, i.e., those of its environment. And
when we determine the wave function of a system we do so on the basis of the configuration
of the environment. Recall also that both aspects of the wave function of a subsystem,
the statistical and the dynamical, cannot coherently be formulated without reference to
configurations. It is therefore not at all astonishing that orthodox quantum theory, by
refusing to accept configurations as part of the description of the state of a system, has
led to so much conceptual confusion.
Note that the fact that thermodynamics seems to depend only upon ψ, and not on any
contribution to the total thermodynamic entropy from the actual configuration X , is an
immediate consequence of quantum equilibrium: For a universe in quantum equilibrium
the entropy associated with configurations is maximal, i.e., constant as a functional of ψ,
and thus plays no thermodynamic role.
A crucial feature of our quantum universe is the peaceful coexistence between global
equilibrium (quantum) and nonequilibrium (thermodynamic), providing us with what we
may regard as an “equilibrium laboratory,” a glimpse, as it were, of pure equilibrium,
with all the surprising consequences it entails. Our analysis has shown how the interplay
between the corresponding levels of structure—the nonequilibrium level given by the wave
function, and, beneath the level of the wave function, that of the particles, described by
their positions, in equilibrium relative to the wave function—leads to the randomness and
uncertainty so characteristic of quantum theory. We shall explore elsewhere [30] how this
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(hierarchical) structure itself naturally arises, and what its deeper significance might be.
(See also Bohm [17].)
We have argued, and believe our analysis demonstrates, that quantum randomness can
best be understood as arising from ordinary “classical” uncertainty—about what is there
but unknown. The denial of the existence of this unknowable—or only partially knowable—
reality leads to ambiguity, incoherence, confusion, and endless controversy. What does it
gain us?
Appendix: Random points
In the following remarks we expand upon concepts introduced in this paper, placing our
conclusions within a broader perspective and comparing ours with related approaches.
1. Bohmian mechanics is what emerges from Schro¨dinger’s equation, which is said to
describe the evolution of the wave function of a system of particles , when we take this
language seriously, i.e., when we insist that “particles” means particles. Thus Bohmian
mechanics is the minimal interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum theory, arising as it
does from the assertion that a familiar word has its familiar meaning.
In particular, if Bohmian mechanics is somehow strange or unacceptable, it must be
because either Schro¨dinger’s equation, or the assertion that “particles” means particles,
or their combination is strange or unacceptable. Now the assertion that “particles”
means particles can hardly be regarded as in any way problematical. On the other hand,
Schro¨dinger’s equation, for a field on configuration space, is a genuine innovation, though
one that physicists by now, of course, take quite for granted. However, as we have seen
in Section 2, when it is appropriately combined with the assertion that “particles” means
particles, its strangeness is, in fact, very much diminished.
2. Quantum mechanics is notoriously nonlocal [52], a novelty which is in no way amelio-
rated by Bohmian mechanics. In fact, “in this theory an explicit causal mechanism exists
whereby the disposition of one piece of apparatus affects the results obtained with a distant
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piece” [2]. We wish to emphasize, however, that relative to the wave function, Bohmian
mechanics is completely local : the nonlocality in Bohmian mechanics derives solely from
the nonlocality built into the structure of standard quantum theory, as provided by a wave
function on configuration space.
That the guiding wave, in the general case, propagates not in ordinary three-
space but in a multidimensional-configuration space is the origin of the notorious
‘nonlocality’ of quantum mechanics. It is a merit of the de Broglie-Bohm version
to bring this out so explicitly that it cannot be ignored. (Bell [5])
3. A rather fortunate property of Bohmian mechanics is that the behavior of the parts—of
subsystems—reflects that of the whole. Indeed, if this were not the case it would have
been difficult, if not impossible, to have ever discovered the full theory. We believe that
a major reason nonlocality is so often regarded as problematical is not nonlocality per se
but rather that it suggests the breakdown of precisely this feature.
4. Notice that the effective wave function ψ is, in effect, a “collapsed” wave function. Thus
our analysis implicitly explains the status and role of “collapse of the wave packet” in the
quantum formalism. (See also Point 21, recalling that the Wigner formula [60] for the
joint distribution of the outcomes of a sequence of quantum measurements, to which we
there refer, is usually based upon collapse.)
In particular, note that the effective wave function of a subsystem evolves according
to Schro¨dinger’s equation only when this system is suitably isolated. More generally, the
evolution ψ(t) of the effective wave function defines a stochastic process, one which embod-
ies collapse in just the right way—with respect to the conditional probability distribution
given the (initial) configuration of the environment of the composite system which includes
the apparatus, with ψ the effective wave function of the system alone, i.e., not including
the apparatus. For details see [29].
Note also that the very notion of effective wave function, as well as its behavior, depends
upon the location of the split between the “observed” and the “observer,” i.e., between
the system of interest and the rest of the world, a dependence whose importance has been
emphasized by Bohr [22], by von Neumann [56], and by a great many others, see for
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example [12,40,43]. In particular, while the effective wave function will “collapse” during
measurement if the apparatus is not included in the system, it need not, in principle,
collapse if the apparatus is included, precisely as emphasized by von Neumann [56]. But
von Neumann was left with the “measurement paradox,” while with Bohmian mechanics
no hint of paradox remains.
5. The fact that knowledge of the configuration of a system must be mediated by its
wave function may partially account, from a Bohmian perspective, for how the physics
community could identify the state of a quantum system—its complete description—with
its wave function without encountering any practical difficulties. Indeed, the conclusion of
our analysis can be partially summarized with the assertion that the wave function ψ of
a subsystem represents maximal information about its configuration X . This is primarily
because of the wave function’s statistical role, but its dynamical role is also relevant here.
Thus it is natural, even in Bohmian mechanics, to regard the wave function as the “state”
of the system.
6. It has been clear, at least since von Neumann [56], that for all practical purposes
the quantum formalism, regarded in strictly operational terms, is consistent. However,
it has not, at least for many (e.g., Einstein), been clear that the “full” quantum theory,
regarded as including the assertion of “completeness” based upon Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle—which has itself traditionally been regarded as arising from the apparent impos-
sibility of certain measurements described in more or less classical terms—is also consistent.
(See [54] for a recent expression of related concerns.) If nothing else, Bohmian mechanics
establishes and makes clear this consistency—even including absolute uncertainty.
Indeed, as is well known, Einstein tried for many years to devise thought experiments
in which the limitations expressed by the uncertainty principle could be evaded. The
reason Einstein persisted in this endeavor is presumably connected with the fact that the
arguments presented by Heisenberg and Bohr against such a possibility were, to say the
least, not entirely convincing, relying, as they did, on a peculiar, nearly contradictory,
combination of quantum and classical “reasoning.” In this regard, recall that in order
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to rescue (a version of) the uncertainty principle from one of Einstein’s final onslaughts
(see [21]), Bohr felt compelled to exploit certain effects arising from Einstein’s general
theory of relativity [21].
However, from the perspective of a Bohmian universe the uncertainty principle is sharp
and clear. In particular, from such a perspective it makes no sense to try to devise thought
experiments by means of which the uncertainty principle can be evaded, since this principle
is a mathematical consequence of Bohmian mechanics itself. One could, of course, imagine
a universe governed by different laws, in which the uncertainty principle, and a great deal
else, would be violated, but there can be no universe governed by Bohmian mechanics—and
in quantum equilibrium— which fails to embody absolute uncertainty and the uncertainty
principle which it entails.
7. The notion of effective wave function developed in Section 5 should perhaps be compared
with a related notion of Bohm, namely, the “active” piece of the wave function [19,20] (see
also Bohm [13]): If Ψ is of the form (5.12) with the supports of Ψ(1) and Ψ(2) “sufficiently
disjoint,” then Ψ(i) is “active” if the actual configuration Q is in the support of Ψ(i).
(See (5.13) and the surrounding discussion.) When this active wave function appropriately
factorizes—see (5.6)—the (active) wave function of a subsystem could be defined in terms
of the obvious factor.
This notion of subsystem wave function will agree with ours if, as is likely to be the
case, the active and inactive pieces have suitably disjoint y-supports, and it will otherwise
disagree. (In this regard see also Point 20.) For example, if
Ψ(i)(x, y) = ψ(i)(x)Φ(y) (A.1)
with ψ(1) and ψ(2) suitably disjoint (e.g., because the x-system is macroscopic and ...)
then the “active” wave function of the x-system is the appropriate ψ(i), while using our
notion the x-system has effective wave function ψ(1)+ψ(2). Note, in particular, that with
our notion the effective wave function of the universe is the universal wave function Ψ, not
the active piece of Ψ.
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Our notion of effective wave function—and not the notion based upon the active piece—
has a distinctly epistemological aspect: While for both choices we have that “ρ = |ψ|
2
”,
the latter will be the conditional distribution given the configuration of the environment
only if ψ agrees with our effective (or conditional) wave function. Moreover, whenever we
can be said to “know that the x-system has wave function ψ,” then the x-system indeed
has effective wave function ψ in our sense.
Note that while both of these choices are somewhat vague, in that they appeal to the
notion of the “macroscopic”—or to some such notion—our effective wave function, when
it exists, is, as we have seen, completely unambiguous. Moreover, as we have also seen,
with our notion reference to something like the macroscopic is not critical. Removing such
a reference—as we did in defining the notion of the conditional wave function—leads to
a precise formulation which remains entirely adequate (in fact, perfect) for our purposes.
But for the choice based on the active piece, removing such a reference would lead to utter
vagueness.
There is, of course, no real physics contingent upon a particular choice of (notion of)
“effective wave function”; rather this choice is simply a matter of convenience of expression,
of how we talk most efficiently about the physics. But such considerations can be quite
important!
8. Sometimes it is helpful to try to imagine how things appear to God. This is of course
audacious, but, in fact, the very activity of a physicist, his attempting to find the deepest
laws of nature, is nothing if not audacious. Indeed, one might even argue that the defining
activity of the physicist is the search for the divine perspective.
Be that as it may, to create a universe God must first decide upon the ontology—on
what there is—and then on the dynamical laws—on how what is behaves. But this alone
would not be sufficient. What is missing is a particular realization, out of all possible
solutions, of the dynamics—the one corresponding to the actual universe. In other words,
at least for a deterministic theory, what is further required is a choice of initial conditions.
And unless there is somehow a natural special choice, the simplest possibility would appear
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to be a completely random initial condition, with an appropriate natural measure for the
description of this randomness (whatever this might mean, even given the measure). The
notion of typicality so defined would, in a sense, be an essential ingredient of the theory
governing this hypothetical universe.
For Bohmian mechanics, with somehow given initial wave function Ψ0, this measure of
typicality is given by the quantum equilibrium distribution |Ψ0|
2
. Moreover, the dynamics
itself is also generated by Ψ0. It seems most fitting that God should design the universe in
so efficient a manner, that a single object, the wave function Ψ0, should generate all the
necessary (extra-ontological) ingredients.
9. Regarding the question of universal initial conditions, we should perhaps contrast the
issue of the initial configuration with that of the initial wave function. Insofar as the
latter is a nonequilibrium wave function, the initial wave function must correspond to low
entropy—it must be very atypical, i.e., of a highly improbable character. As has been much
emphasized by R. Penrose [49], in order to understand our nonequilibriuim world we must
face the problem of why God should have chosen such improbable initial conditions as
demanded by nonequilibrium. On the other hand, for the universal initial configuration—
in quantum equilibrium—we of course have no such problem. On the contrary, quantum
randomness itself, including even absolute uncertainty, arising as it does from quantum
equilibrium, in effect requires no explanation. (Concerning the choice of initial universal
wave function, see also Point 13.)
10. Naive agreement with the quantum formalism demands the existence of a small set
of bad initial configurations, corresponding to outcomes which are very unlikely but not
impossible. It is thus hard to see how our results could be improved upon or significantly
strengthened.
More generally, for any theory with probablistic content, particularly one describing
a relativistic universe, we arrive at a similar conclusion: Once we recognize that there
is but one world (of relevance to us), only one actual space-time history, we must also
recognize that the ultimate meaning of probability, insofar as it employed in the formulation
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of the predictions of the theory, must be in terms of a specification of typicality—one
such that theoretically predicted empirical distributions are typical. When all is said and
done, the physical import of the theory must arise from its provision of such a notion
of typical space-time histories (at the very least of “macroscopic” events), presumably
specified via a probability distribution on the set of all (kinematically) possible histories.
And given a theory, i.e., such a probability distribution, describing a large but finite
universe, atypical space-time histories, with empirical distributions disagreeing with the
theoretical predictions, are, though extremely unlikely, not impossible.
11. It is quite likely that the fiber QYt ≡
{
Q ∈ Q
∣∣ Yt = Y } of Q for which Yt = Y ,
discussed in Section 7, is extremely small, owing to the expansive and dispersive effects of
the Laplacian ∆ in Schro¨dinger’s equation. If so, it follows that any regular (continuous)
Ψ0 (or |Ψ0|
2
) should be approximately constant on QYt (as on any sufficiently small set of
initial conditions). This would imply that PYt , the conditional measure given Q
Y
t , should
be approximately the same as the uniform distribution—Lebesgue measure—on QYt , so
that typicality defined in terms of quantum equilibrium agrees with typicality in terms of
Lebesgue measure.
Now, as we have already indicated in Section 4, under more careful scrutiny this argu-
ment does not sustain its appearance of relevance. However, it may nonetheless have some
heuristic value.
12. We wish to emphasize that a byproduct of our analysis, quite aside from the relevance of
this analysis to the interpretation of quantum theory, is the clarification and illumination of
the meaning and role of probability in a deterministic (or even nondeterministic) universe.
Moreover, our analysis of statistical tests in Section 7—the very triviality of this analyis, see
equations (7.8) and (7.10)—sharply underlines the centrality of typicality in the elucidation
of the concept of probability.
13. We should mention some examples of nonequilibrium (initial) universal wave functions:
(1) Suppose that physical space is finite, say the 3-torus T3 rather than R3, and suppose,
say, that the potential energy V = 0. Let Ψ0(q1, . . . ,qN ) = 1 if all qi ∈ B, where B ⊂ T
3
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is a “small” region in physical space, and be otherwise 0. Then Ψ0 is a nonequilibrium wave
function, since an equilibrium wave function should be “spread out” over T3. Moreover the
initial quantum equilibrium distribution on configurations is uniform over configurations
of N particles in B.
More generally, any well localized Ψ0 is a nonequilibrium wave function. And if physical
space is R3, any localized or square-integrable wave function is a nonequilibrium wave
function.
(2) For a nonequilibrium wave function of a rather different character, consider the
following: Take T3 again for physical space, but instead of considering free particles,
suppose that V arises from Coulomb interactions, with half of the particles having charge
+e and half −e. Now suppose that Ψ0 is constant, Ψ0 = 1 on T
3. (Thus, quantum
equilibrium now initially corresponds to a uniform distribution on configurations.) That
this Ψ0, though “spread out,” is nevertheless a nonequilibrium wave function can be seen
in various ways. Dynamically, the Schro¨dinger evolution should presumably lead to the
formation of “atoms,” of suitable pairing in the (support properties of the) wave function.
Entropically, Ψ0 is very special. An equilibrium ensemble of initial wave functions is
determined by the values of the infinite set of constants of the motion given by the absolute
squares of the amplitudes with respect to a basis of energy eigenfunctions. Wave functions
in this ensemble are then specified by the phases of these amplitudes. A random choice of
phases leads to an equilibrium wave function, which should reflect the existence of “atoms.”
On the other hand, the wave function Ψ0 = 1 corresponds to a particular, very special
choice of phases, so that “atoms cancel out.”
Note also that this example is relevant to the Penrose problem mentioned in Point 9.
What choice of initial wave function could be simpler—and thus in a sense more natural—
than the one which is everywhere constant? And, again, while it might at first glance seem
that this choice corresponds to equilibrium, the attractive (in both senses) effects of the
Coulomb interaction presumably imply that this is not so!
From a classical perspective the situation is similar: The initial state in which the
particles are uniformly distributed in space with velocities all 0 (or with independent
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Maxwellian velocities) is a nonequilibrium state. In fact, an infinite amount of entropy
can be extracted from suitable clustering of the particles, arising from the great volume in
momentum space liberated when pairs of oppositely charged particles get close. (Of course,
for Newtonian gravitation—as well as for general relativity—this tendency to cluster is, in
a sense, far stronger still.)
14. To account for (the) most (familiar) applications of the quantum formalism one rarely
needs to apply (the conclusions of) our quantum equilibrium analysis to systems of the
form (5.4): Randomness in the result of even a quantum measurement usually arises
solely from randomness in the system, randomness in the apparatus making essentially no
contribution. This is because most real-world measurements are of the scattering-detection
type—and a particle (or atom ...) will be detected more or less where it’s at. Think, for
example, of a two-slit-type experiment, or of the purpose of a cloud chamber, or of a
Stern-Gerlach measurement of spin.
15. When all is said and done, what does the incorporation of actual configurations buy
us? A great deal! It accounts for:
(1) randomness
(2) absolute uncertainty
(3) the meaning of the wave function of a (sub)system
(4) collapse of the wave packet
(5) coherent—indeed, familiar—(macroscopic) reality
Moreover, it makes possible an appreciation of the basic significance of the universal wave
function Ψ, as an embodiment of law , which cannot be clearly discerned without a coherent
ontology to be governed by some law.
16. Recall that in principle the wave function ψ of a (sub)system could depend upon
the universal wave function Ψ and on the choice of system σ = (π, T ), as well as on the
configuration Y of the environment of this system. In practice, however, in situations in
which we in fact know what ψ is, it must be given by a function of Y alone, not depending
upon σ, nor even on Ψ (for “reasonable” nonequilibrium Ψ). After all, what else, beyond Y ,
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do we have at our disposal to take into account when we conclude that a particular system
has wave function ψ? In particular, Ψ is unknown, apart from what we can conclude about
it on the basis of Y (and perhaps some a priori assumptions about reasonable initial Ψ0’s.
But even if Ψ0 were known precisely, this information would be of little use here, since
solving Schro¨dinger’s equation to obtain Ψ would be out of the question!)
Thus, whatever we can in practice conclude about ψ must be based upon a universal
function—of Y . It would be worthwhile to explore and elucidate the details of this function,
analyzing the rules we follow in obtaining knowledge and trying to understand the validity
of these rules. However, such considerations are not directly relevant to our purposes in this
paper, where our goal has been primarily to establish sharp limitations on the possibility
of knowledge rather than to analyze what renders it at all possible. We have argued that
the latter problem is perhaps far more difficult than the former, and, indeed, that this is
not terribly astonishing.
17. In view of the similarity between Bohmian mechanics and stochastic mechanics
[44,45,46], for which similarity see [35,28], all of our arguments and results can be trans-
ferred to stochastic mechanics without significant modification. More important, the moti-
vation for stochastic mechanics is the rather plausible suggestion that quantum randomness
might originate from the merging of classical dynamics with intrinsic randomness, as de-
scribed by a diffusion process, and with “noise” determined by ~. Insofar as our results
demonstrate how quantum randomness naturally emerges without recourse to any such
“noise,” they rather drastically erode the evidential basis of stochastic mechanics.
18. The analyis of Bohmian mechanics presented here is relevant to the problem of the
interpretation and application of quantum theory in cosmology, specifically, to the problem
of the significance of ρ = |ψ|
2
on the cosmological level—where there is nothing outside of
the system to perform the measurements from which ρ = |ψ|
2
derives its very meaning in
orthodox quantum theory.
19. Our random system analysis illuminates the flexibility of Bohmian mechanics: It
illustrates how joint probabilities as predicted by the quantum formalism, even for config-
67
urations, may arise from measurement and bear little resemblance to the probabilities for
unmeasured quantities. And our analysis highlights the mathematical features which make
this possible. This flexibility could be quite important for achieving an understanding of
the relativistic domain, where it may happen that quantum equilibrium prevails only on
special space-time surfaces (see [28]). Our (random system) multitime analysis illustrates
how this need entail no genuine obstacle to obtaining the quantum formalism. (Our argu-
ment here of course involved the natural hypersurfaces given by {t = const.}, but the only
feature of these surfaces critical to our analysis was the validity of quantum equilibrium,
or, more precisely, of the fundamental conditional probability formula (6.1).)
20. A notion intermediate between that of the effective wave function and that of the condi-
tional wave function of a subsystem, a more-general-effective wave function which like the
effective wave function is “stable,” may be obtained by replacing, in the definition (5.17)–
(5.18) of effective wave function, the reference to macroscopically disjoint y-supports by
“sufficiently disjoint” y-supports. This notion of more-general-effective wave function is,
of course, rather vague. But we wish to emphasize that the y-supports of Φ and Ψ⊥ may
well be sufficiently disjoint to render negligible the (effects of) future interference between
the terms of (5.17)—so that if (5.18) is satisfied, ψ will indeed fully function dynamically
as the wave function of the x-system—without their having to be actually macroscopically
disjoint.
In fact, owing to the interactions—expressed in Schro¨dinger’s equation—among the
many degrees of freedom, the amount of y-disjointness in the supports of Φ and Ψ⊥ will
typically tend to increase dramatically as time goes on, with, as in a chain reaction,
more and more degrees of freedom participating in this disjointness (see [13,42,64,38]; see
also [12])). When the effects of this dissipation or “decoherence” are taken into account,
one finds that a small amount of y-disjointness will often tend quickly to become “suffi-
cient,” indeed becoming “much more sufficient” as time goes on, and very often indeed
becoming macroscopic. Moreover, if ever we are in the position of knowing that a system
has more-general-effective wave function ψ, then ψ must be its effective wave function,
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since our knowledge must be based on or grounded in macroscopic distinctions (if only in
the eye or brain).
Concerning dissipation, we wish also to emphasize that in practice the problem is not
how to arrange for it to occur but how to keep it under control, so that superpositions of
(sub)system wave functions retain their coherence and thus may interfere.
21. If we relax the condition (10.3), requiring that ψσi be nonrandom, and stipulate instead
merely that
ψσi ∈ F(Z1, . . . , Zi−1), (A.2)
we find that Z1, . . . , ZM have joint distribution given by the familiar (Wigner) formula [60]
(see also [56] and [1]).
22. We wish to compare (what we take to be the lessons of) Bohmian mechanics with
the approach of Gell-Mann and Hartle (GMH) [31,32]. Unhappy about the irreducible
reference to the observer in the orthodox formulation of quantum theory, particularly
insofar as cosmology is concerned, they propose a program to extract from the quantum
formalism a “quasiclassical domain of familiar experience,” which, if we understand them
correctly, defines for them the basic ontology of quantum theory. This they propose to do
by regarding the Wigner formula (referred to in Points 4 and 21), for the joint probabilities
of the results of a sequence of measurements of quantum observables, as describing the
probabilities of objective, i.e., not-necessarily-measured, events—what they call alternative
histories. Of course, owing to interference effects one quickly gets into trouble here unless
one restricts this use of the Wigner formula to what they call alternative (approximately)
decohering histories, for which the Wigner formula can indeed be regarded as defining
(approximate) probabilities, which are additive under coarse-graining. Thus far GMH in
essence reproduce the work of Griffiths [36] and Omnes [47]. But, as GMH further note,
the condition of (approximate) decoherence by itself allows for far too many possibilities.
They thus introduce additional conditions, such as “fullness” and “maximality,” as well
as propose certain (as yet tentative) measures of “classicity” to define an optimization
procedure they hope will yield a more or less unique quasiclassical domain. (They also
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consider the possibility that there may be many quasiclassical domains, each of which
would presumably define a different physical theory.)
As in our analysis of Bohmian mechanics, universal initial conditions—for GMH the
initial universal wave function(or density matrix)—play a critical role. And just as in
Bohmian mechanics, the wave function does not provide a complete description of the
universe, but rather attains physical significance from the role it plays in generating the
behavior of something else, something physically primitive—for GMH the quasiclassical
domain.
Insofar as nonrelativistic quantum theory is concerned, a significant difference between
Bohmian mechanics and the proposal of GMH is that the latter defines a research program
while the former is an already existing, and sharply formulated, physical theory. And as far
as relativistic quantum theory is concerned, we believe that, appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding, the lesson of Bohmian mechanics is one of flexibility (see also Point 19)
while the approach of GMH is rigid. In saying this we have in mind, on the one hand, that
GMH insist (1) that the possible ontologies be limited by the usual quantum description,
i.e., correspond to a suitable (possibly time-dependent) choice of self-adjoint operators on
Hilbert space; and (2) that this ontology be constrained further by the quantum formalism,
demanding that its evolution be governed by the Wigner formula—so that for them, but
not for Bohmian mechanics, the consideration of decoherence indeed becomes essential,
bound up with questions of ontology.
On the other hand, one lesson of Bohmian mechanics is that ontology need not be so
constrained. While the quantum formalism must—and for Bohmian mechanics does—
emerge in measurement-type situations, the behavior of the basic variables, describing the
fundamental ontology, outside of these situations need bear no resemblance to anything
suggested by the quantum formalism. (Recall, in fact, that it quite frequently happens
that simple, symmetric laws on a deeper level of description lead to a less symmetric
phenomenological description on a higher level.) Indeed, these basic variables, whether
they describe positions, or field configurations, or what have you, need not even correspond
to self-adjoint operators. That they rather trivially do in Bohmian mechanics is, in part,
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merely an artifact of the equivariant measure’s being a strictly local functional of the wave
function, which was in no way crucial to our analysis.
In particular, while dissipation or decoherence are relevant both to Bohmian mechanics
and to GMH, for GMH they are crucial to the formulation of the theory, to the specifi-
cation of an ontology , while for Bohmian mechanics they are relevant only on the level of
phenomenology . And insofar as the formation of new theories is concerned, the lesson of
Bohmian mechanics is to look for fundamental microscopic laws appropriate to the (or a)
natural choice of ontology, rather than to let the ontology itself be dictated by some law,
let alone by what is usually regarded as a macroscopic measurement formalism.
It is perhaps worth considering briefly the two-slit experiment. In Bohmian mechan-
ics the electron, indeed, goes through one or the other of the two slits, the interference
pattern arising because the arrival of the electron at the “photographic” plate reflects the
interference profile of the wave function governing the motion of the electron. In partic-
ular, and this is what we wish to emphasize here, in Bohmian mechanics a spot appears
somewhere on the plate because the electron arrives there; while for GMH “the electron
arrives somewhere” because the spot appears there.
23. There is one situation where we may, in fact, know more about configurations than
what is conveyed by the quantum equilibrium hypothesis ρ = |ψ|
2
: when we ourselves are
part of the system! See, for example, the paradox of Wigner’s friend [59]. In thinking
about this situation it is important to note well that, while it may be merely a matter of
convention whether or not we choose to include say ourselves in the subsystem of inter-
est, the wave function to which the quantum equilibrium hypothesis refers—that of the
subsystem—depends crucially on this choice.
24. We have shown, in part here and in part in [29], how the quantum formalism emerges
within a Bohmian universe in quantum equilibrium. Thus, evidence for the quantum
formalism is evidence for quantum equilibrium—global quantum equilibrium. This should
be contrasted with the thermodynamic situation, in which the evidence points towards
pockets of thermodynamic equilibrium within global thermodynamic nonequilibrium.
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The reader may wish to explore quantum nonequilibrium. What sort of behavior would
emerge in a universe which is initially in quantum nonequilibrium? What phenomenologi-
cal formalism or laws would govern such behavior? We happen to have no idea! We know
only that such a world is not our world! Or do we?
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